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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
So often in the daily newSpapers articles are printed listing 
new" firsts tl in the atomic age; for instance, the nuclear subma-
rine Nautilus and the sending of Polaris rockets and interconti-
nental ballistic missiles into outer space. Similarly, Ala,ska 
can be listed as having tvo It firsts" to its credit, for besides 
being the first noncontiguous territory purchased by the United 
states, it recently has become the first noncontiguous state of 
the United States. The stories of its fisheries, furs, and gold, 
not to mention its coal and other mineral resources, have been the 
stories of trappers and adventurers for the past two hundred years. 
Books, articles, and newspapers abound in extolling these riches 
and in attracting many travelers annually. 
If then the United States is so fortunate to possess Alaska, 
the question concerning the background and especially the reasons 
for the purchase naturally arises. This i8 the purpose of the the-
sis, namely, to evaluate the reasons that have been offered for 
the purchase of Alaska. There are apparently two possible methods 
of handling this problem; either examining all the pertinent docu-
ments and then compiling a list of reasons or discovering a list 
1 
2 
of reasons offered by some contemporary witness of the purchase and 
then setting about to evaluate those in the light of the writing 
that has been done on the subject. It is the latter method that 
will be employed in this essay. 
Basically the outline tor the thesis has been drawn trom a 
reading of Henry W. Clark's History ~ Alaska,in the chapter in 
which he treats of the purchase. Here he attempts to analyze the 
reasons tor the purchase listed, so he claims, by Senator Charles 
Sumner. These reasons can be brietly summarized as: the desire ot 
the Pacitic coast for tisheries and other privileges, the refusal 
ot Russia to renew the charter ot the Russian American Company, the 
friendship of Russia and the United States, the necessity of pre-
venting England trom getting the territory, the creation ot new 
industrial interests on the Pacific necessary to the supremacy of 
our empire on sea and land, and lastly, the securing ot unlimited 
commerce with Japan and China. Clark brietly comments on the tirst 
four reasons separately and then adds, liThe last two reasons as 
part of our big talk on Manifest Destiny or its equivalent may pos-
sibly have weight. They lead us to the inevitable conclusion that 
the chief reason for the United States buying Alaaka was William H. 
Seward." But he believea that no one can definitely determine 
hether Seward desired to aggrandize America and make her supreme 
n this continent, or whether he was interested in a good base in 
he Aleutians, or whether he wanted to gain popularity in his 
3 
party by his action. In conclusion Clark maintains that certainly 
the purchase "was not done in any spirit of far-sighted policy by 
1 
the American government." 
Certain facts, however, do not seem to sUbstantiate the above 
statements. Although Clark affirms that h. book is a "compendium 
of the valuable research of such scholars as Ga~~ar, Stefansson, 
Andrews, Spicer, Farrand and others,U he seems to have overlooked 
some important contributions to the questi,), .'~i,de before the book 
2 
was published. Besides, some additional insights into the prob-
lem, scattered in various sources, have been offered since the ap-
pearance of the book and will be incorporated here. Even though 
another history of Alaska has been written in recent years, a com-
prehensive analysis of the reasons for the purchase apparently was 
3 
not made. Hence such a study seems warranted. 
As is clear from the title, the thesis will attempt to examine 
the six reasons for the purchase offered by Representative Banks. 
To fulfill this task, it is necessary to show the early interest 
1 
Henry W. Clark, History of Alaska (New York, 1930), pp. 79-
80. This was republished under the title Alaska: The Last Fron-
tier (New York, 1939). The reasons as listed must be ascri~to 
Representative Nathaniel P. Banks, Chairman of the House Committee 
on Foreign Relations. Cf. U. S. Congress, House, Reports of 
Committees of the House of Representatives, No. 37, 40th Cong., 
2nd Sess. (Washington, 1~8), p. 11. 
2 Clark, x. 
3Stuart R. Tompkins, Alaska: Promyshlennik and Sourdough 
(Norman, 1952), pp. 188-190. 
Russia in Russian America. This will be followed by considering 
the growing commercial interests of the United States and Great 
Britain in and around Russian America and the conflicts that arose 
between the two countries. The next chapter wlll relate the chan~ 
ing attitude of Russia towards her American possesslons and espe-
cially towards expansion. Coupled with this discussion will be a 
study of the early attempts at a sale of the territory and the pu~ 
chase itself. In the following chapter a study of the first four 
reasons listed by Representative Banks will be made as these af-
fected Russia and Great Britaln. The final chapter will treat of 
the last two reasons as they showed the attitude of the United 
States towards expansion and commerce, especially in the Pacific 
and the Far East. Here the interest of William H. Seward in the 
Far East will be emphasized in order to determine the extent of 
its importance in reference to the purchase. It becomes apparent, 
then, that the purchase of Alaska ought to be viewed, not as an 
isolated incident, but as part of a larger framework of events, 
for the purchase, involvlng two countries, was affected by their 
foreign relations, not only with each other, but also principally 
with Great Britain. The triangle thus formed by these countries 
is the basic structure within whlch the purchase will be 
considered. 
CHAPTER II 
RUSSIA IN RUSSIAN AMERICA: THE BEGINNINGS 
If someone were to look for the key to Russian foreign policy 
in the Pacitic and the Far East from the days of Peter the Great 
until the days ot Alexander II in 1850-1860, that key is turnished 
in the Amur River Valley. This area was strategically important 
to Russia because in 1689 it was her only outlet to the sea on the 
Pacitic coast. Russia was then moving to the east by way of 8ibe-
ria, while at the same time other European countries were making 
their tirst contacts with China by an all-sea route. The tirst 
Russian adventurers consisted of explorers, tur traders, and fugi-
tives trom the law. Once they had penetrated into tar eastern 
Siberia, it was natural that they would move south into the valley 
ot the Amur River. Rere a contlict arose between the Russian ad-
venturers and the tribal peoples who theoretically recognized the 
sovereignty ot China. In 1689 a boundary settlement was ettected 
by the Treaty of Xerchinsk, which provided that the Albasin, a 
Russian outpost on the upper Amur, was to be destroyed, that the 
Russians were to withdraw completely trom the valley, and finally, 
that the ridge of the Stanovoi Mountains vas to be considered the 
boundary line separating the two empires. It was China's first 
5 
6 
treaty w1th a Western power and one wh1ch was to be a control11ng 
influence over the relat10ns of the two countr1es for the next two 
1 
centur1es. 
Because of th1s 10s8 of a strateg1c p01nt, Russ1an expans10n 
turned northward and further east. Peter the Great, who began h1s 
re1gn 1n 1689, the same year as the s1gn1ng of the treaty, aff1rmed 
that there were three p01nts of 1mportance to Russ1a: the mouths of 
2 
the Don, the Neva, and the Amur R1vers. Of these three, however, 
the Amur was pre.em1nent, for the loss of th1s r1ver reg10n had de-
pr1ved eastern S1ber1a and later Russ1an Amer1ca of a source of 
food supply. Secondly 1t h1ndered Russ1a from obta1n1ng a f1rm ba-
s1s 1n Ch1nese commerce, and thirdly 1t checked any plans for open-
ing commercial relat10ns w1th Japan. Peter the Great was well 
aware of the s1gn1f1cance of the Amur, but he was held 1n check to 
~bta1n the three strongholds for Russ1a. Not unt11 1721 d1d he ob-
~a1n the Neva, but he was unsuccessful 1n h1s attempts to obta1n 
~1rect access to the Black Sea through the Don. Four years later 
~e sent Capta1n V1tus Ber1ng to f1nd out the relat10n between As1a 
~nd Amer1ca, although 1t seems that he was to "open up the Amur 
3 
lluest10n poss1'tJ.y 1n connect1on v1 th an exped1 t10n by land." In 
1 
Robert J. Kerner, tl Russ1an Expans10n to America: Its Biblio-
~raph1cal Foundat1ons," B1b11ographical Soc1ety of America Papers" 
~XY (1931), 111; Paul H. Clyde, The Far last (New York, 1949), p. 
~5j Frank A. Golder, Russ1an Expans1on-on-ihe Pacific, 1641-1850 
Cleveland, 1914), p. 64. - - - -
2 
Kerner, pp. 111-112. 
3Ib1d. 113. 
7 
~728, horrever, during the course of his first voyage, Bering was 
~nsuccessful in solving the problem. In 1732 he was ordered to 
~ndertake a second voyage to learn about the land which it was sur-
~ised was the American continent and to speak, if possible, with 
~he natives to determine it the land was definitely the sbore of 
~merica. Although this expedition dld not set sail until 1741, it 
~id achieve an important opening of an era ot Russian expansion, 
Cor Bering came close to the American continent and could see at a 
ilstance the snow-capped heights ot Mount St. Ilias. In the name 
)f Russia he claimed groups ot hitherto unknown islands, saw the 
~leuts at Nagai Island, claimed more islands in the Aleutian chain, 
and subsequently died on one ot the Eomandorsky Islands. It should 
~e noted that it was by accident, not by intention, that Russia 
~ame lnto possession ot territory in America, tor Peter the Great 
~as not interested in tounding colonies, but in knowing the rela-
~ion ot Asia to America. 
With the establishment of Russian claims, many adventurers 
,isited the Aleutian Islands to traffic in furs, for these iSlands 
~erved as a chain from Eamchatka to America. No permanent estab-
~ishment, however, was erected either on the islands or on the con-
~inent. The wealthier traders came to st. Petersburg to ask for 
~pecial privileges and to bring charges against tbeir competitors. 
n addition to these Russian promoters there were foreigners who 
~ffered to lead expeditions of discovery and to extend Russian 
~ommerce and empire in the Indies and America, tor this was the 
8 
last part of the eighteenth century when European capitals were 
full of such projects. Catherine, the Empress at the time, had to 
decide whether or not it was tor the best interest of her empire to 
acquire overseas possessions, far from the seat of government. Ex-
pansion was not a novel idea for Russia as is evidenced by her an-
nexation of contiguous territory; but the Horth American territory 
vas ditferent for it was across the sea. Catherine realized that 
in order to hold colonies as far away as these a nation must have 
an overtlowing population and a navy. Russia had neither. To 
understand Russia's problem in Russian America these two factors--
the need ot a surplus population and ot a navy--must be borne in 
~ind in the background ot Russiats desire to win control ot the 
~mur River Valley once more. 
Atter thinking the subject over, the Impress decided to act. 
~er answer was a retusal to turnish men, ships, or money to help 
the adventurers. In 1181 two Siberian merchants again laid betore 
~he Empress a petition to colonize that land and to extend the lim-
~t8 ot the Russian empire, if the Empress would grant them and 
~heir company special commercial privileges; but Catherine followed 
~er policy by declaring that the lesson ot England's loss ot her 
colonies in America should be a warning to other nations that would 
attempt the same course. Furthermore, all Siberians were needed 
~n their native land, for, according to the Empress, one hundred 
~iberians were worth one thousand Europeans. Thus she favored a 
laissez-faire policy ot claiming the territory, but not ot holding 
4 
or governing it. 
9 
With the accession of Pau~ I, however, such a po~icy wou~d 
not withstand the interference of the trading ships of other na-
tions. In ~776 Captain James Cook sai~ed to the shores of America 
on the initiative of the East India Company. Be recorded on a map 
under new Eng~ish names a~~ the p~aces he Visited and thus estab. 
lished a basis for an English claim to their discovery. Paul I 
was then faced with the alternative of withdrawing from the Ameri-
can continent or of governing the territory. 'or a time he seri-
ously considered the advisability of prohibiting all Russians from 
going to the territory, which would be equiva~ent to abandoning 
the possessions. Bonetheless, there vere some ministers of state 
who dissuaded him from such a move. Yet the problem grew steadily 
worse, for between 1787 and 1794 four English captains had reached 
the North American shores and one of them, Captain Meares, thought 
it advantageous to obtain a base on one of the Kurile Islands. In 
addition to these "new" discoveries by the English, a growing ri. 
valry between England and Russia commenced over fur trading. Cap-
tain Cook and his successors were successful in obtaining sea-otter 
skins from the Aleutian Islands and sold them at considerable prof-
it in Canton, China. Thi. was a double blow to Russia, for not 
only were the English depriving them of turs in territory they 
4 
'rank A. Golder, "The Attitude of the Russian Government To-
ward Ala.ska," The Pacific Ocean in Bistorl, ed. B. Morse Stephens 
and Herbert E.-aolton (Bew York,-Y9~7), pp. 270-271. 
10 
claimed, but also were taking advantage of the lack of a Russian 
commercial stronghold through which her furs could enter China. 
In 1794 Russia was able, nevertheless, to obtain an official re-
establishment of trade with China which further aggravated the re-
lations with England. 
If then Russian America was to be retained by RUSSia, the fur-
ther question was how was it to be governed. Two suggestions were 
made: one favoring a crown colon~ the other favoring a private com-
pany similar to the Hudson's Bay Company. Up to this time individ-
ual private trading companies had operated under governmental pro-
tection in the North American shores. By 1790 the Shelikhov-Goli-
kov Company outstripped all others. In the latter part of that yeal 
Shelikhov had employed Alexander Andreyevich Baranov, a merchant 
of Kargopol, whose name and influence were felt in Russian America 
until his replacement by Lieutenant-Captain Leontii A. Hagemeister 
on December 1, 1818. By a ukase in 1799 the Shelikhov-Golikov Co. 
pany merged with the Mylnikov group and became the Russian AmericM 
Company. All other companies, by the same imperial edict, were to 
be suppressed. The Company, granted a charter for twenty years, 
was greatly encouraged by the government, especially by the other 
generous grants and monopolistic privileges which had been offered 
to it. To all appearances a new empire in the West was about to 
open; but soon unfavorable reports of death, starvation, and mis-
management found their way to the capital. Twice in the twenty-
year period a special officer was sent to investigate conditions 
11 
there. In 1802 the tribe of Tlingits (also known as Tlinkets and 
whom the Russians called Koliuzhams or Koloshams or Kolosh) swooped 
~own upon the Russian fortifications at Sitka and massacred the in-
~abitants. Added to this was the starvation of a number of Rus-
sians, since the food supply from Siberia that had hitherto sup-
plied these Pacific coasts by means of a treacherous overland 
route waa cut oft. Nikolai Rezanov, brother-in-lav ot Shelikhov, 
bad been despatched a few months before this massacre to strength-
en Russia's position in the Pacitic through the ships of the Im-
perial Bavy given to him. Be vas, moreover, to use the present 
situation to renew attempts at .stablishing diplomatic relations 
with Japan, vhich had been closed since 1793, and to get supplies 
to the Pacitic colonies. Although he was unsuccesstul in opening 
diplomatic relations vith Japan, he hastened back to Petropavlovsk 
whence he embarked on his Journey to America to investigate the 
Russian American Company. Arriving in August, 1804, he found that 
the Company was faced with many mistortunes, the chief ot vhich 
was a lack ot agre.ment betveen the Russians and the Kolosh. It 
was not until July 16, 1805 that the Kolosh tormally submitted and 
signed a treaty with Baranov by which they recognized Russian sov-
ereignty. This did not solve all the Company's problems. The dis-
tressing shortage ot food vas an acute problem that had its reper-
cussions in the aickness, death, disease, and in the rancor among 
the men. To try to solve this difficulty, Rezanov loaded a ship 
with furs and other goods anA eailed to San Prancisco vhere he 
12 
hought he could obtain a cargo of grain to relieve the shortage. 
ere through his marriage to the daughter of the commandant he was 
successful in obtaining the food supplies. Although he wanted to 
stablish a permanent settlement around the Columbia River, he met 
lth no success. When Rezanov set sail for St. Petersburg to re-
ort to the Czar on the conditions of the Company, Baranov again 
took full control. 
Since the Siberian route was weaker and hence less reliable 
or obtaining food, and since he could not obtain it from the Span-
sh colonies in California, Baranov turned to the American traders. 
In 1803 Joseph OICain had arrived in the O'Cain at a time when the 
food stores were low in Kodiak. .aced vith a perilous winter and 
ossible starvation, Baranov bought about 10,000 rubles' worth of 
goods from O'Cain. The latter proposed to Baranov to lend him A-
leuts who would be of assistance in capturing sea otters on the 
shores off Lover California and the 'arallones. This "poaching" 
ecame the regular practice for both Russians and Americans, so 
that many American captains vere willing to follow O'Cain's idea. 
Combined with poaching was the practice of smuggling goods ashore 
and selling them, despite Spanish regulations which forbade com-
erce with the missions. By 1815 this double system of poaching 
and smuggling was the common way by which the Russian American Com-
any was able to subsist. Spain was hardly able to intervene in 
this matter, since she, along with the other European powers, was 
engaged in the Napoleonic Wars, The Pacific coast was last, if 
13 
not least, in importance in diplomatic concerns. 
If then the Russian American Company was struggling to exist 
and the Russian government knev of its plight, vhy did Russia vant 
the Company to govern the territory? The ansver lies in the fact 
that Russian saw that it was best to have a company which would 
look after the interests of the government so that one day the 
Russian government, in taking the territory under its own direc-
tion, vou1d add a province useful to the whole nation. 5 The prov-
ince intended by the government was to include not only the Aleu-
tians, Kamchatka, and Russian America, but also California, the 
Sandwich Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin, and the mouth of 
the Amur River. These latter were to be obtained by the Company 
in the name of the Russian government, 80 that the whole northern 
part of the PaCific would become an inland sea of the Russian em-
Pire. 6 In brief, this was a plan of direct colonial expansion. 
By a curious move diplomatic relations between Russia and the 
United States were begun. The Russians in Russian America had had 
weapons far superior to the natives and hence tbey felt a senee of 
security in resisting any attacks. The 1802 massacre at Sitka 
proved otherWise, for then the Kolosh were using firearms obtained, 
5 Cf. Edward de Stoeckl to Prince Alexander Gorchakov, July 
12/24, 1867, ed. Hunter Miller, "Russian Opinion on the Ceesion of 
Alaska, tI AHB, XLVIII (April 1943), 527. 
6Sem;;-B. Okun, The Russian-American compan!, ed. B.D. 
Grekov, trans. Carl Ginsburg {Ca.mbridge, Mass., ~95l),-~_. 50. 
so the Russians claimed, from Amer1can petty traders. Thus the 
Russians blamed the massacre on the Boston traders and laid a com-
pla1nt before the Russian government. .0 word was received from 
st. Petersburg at Washington until 1808 when Czar Alexander I des-
patched Andrei Dashkov, the Russian consul-general in Philadelphia, 
and named him "charge d'affaires near the congress of the United 
states." The Czar, through Dashkov, stated that the traffic of 
ammunition and liquor was illicit and proposed that both countries 
come to some arrangement by which trading by Americans would be re-
stricted to the port of Kodiak in Russian America. The American 
reply, made in 1810, questioned such a Russian proposal. If the 
Indians were subjects of the Russian Czar, then the United States 
was bound to let its Citizens to be punished according to Russian 
law. If they were not subject to Russian sovereignty, but vere in-
dependent tribes, then any citizen of any nation could trade with 
them, unless it were a question of contraband in time of war. 7 The 
two countries never came to any agreement on this matter, but the 
incident is significant since it established an entrance of the 
United States into the diplomatic relations on the Pacific north-
west coast. 
Further encroachment on Russian-claimed territory was in-
creased in 1810 when John Jacob Astor planted a trading post, 
7Yictor J. Parrar, t1The Background of the Purchase of Alaska," 
WHQ,XIII (April 1922), 93-94. 
15 
Astoria, at the mouth of the Columbia River. This post was sold 
by American citizens to the British North West Company in the War 
of 1812, but was restored to American ownership when Lord Castle-
reagh, British Foreign Secretary, wrote to Sir Charles Bagot, Bri-
tish minister at St. Petersburg, that the United States had true 
ownership, yet he disliked the brusque way in which the Americans 
were seeking to regain possession. This restoration in 1818 was 
not intended to affect the claims of either the Russians or the 
British, although John Quincy Adams, Secretary of state in 1826, 
would Judiciously use this to the detriment of Great Britain. 8 
Meanwhile in 1812 the Russian American Company had penetrated 
southward to 380 north latitude where Fort Ross, near Bodega Bay, 
was established. This colony was ostenSibly to supply the north-
ern posts ~ith grain and meat. Maintained despite Spanish pro-
tests, Fort Ross was held by the Russian American Company in the 
~ope that some future good fortune could make the settlement per-
manent. Not until 1841 was it abandoned by the Russians and sold 
to John Sutter. 9 
Besides this further intrusion on Spanish territory, in 1819 
~he United States signed the Adams-Onis Treaty according to which 
8 Samuel F. Bemis, John guincy Adams and the Foundations of 
~merican Foreign POlicy-riiw York, 1949),-PP.~1-286; 518. --
9 Stuart R. Tompkins, "Drawing the Alaskan Boundary," The 
~anadian Historical Review, XXVI (March 1945), 3. 
16 
the northern boundary of Spain's possessions was fixed at 420 
north latitude. The whole situation was thus enveloped in a state 
of confusion with three powers remaining in the contest for the 
north Pacific--Russia, Great Britain, and the United States--all 
with claims that were ill-defined. The British claim extended 
from about the Arctic to as far south as San Francisco, while 
Russia's claim starting in the north as Britain's extended only as 
far south as the Columbia River. Yet the least clear by far was 
the American claim, for by the Louisiana Purchase a large unknown 
portion of the Pacific coast was included and was added to the 
sovereignty claimed over the Columbia River by reason of the dis-
covery of Captain Gray. Within the next few years these claims 
were to be adjudicated after much wrangling by all three 
antagonists. 
The basis of this diplomatic controversy, however, should be 
studied before we continue the narrative of the outcome of these 
global claims. At the heart of these claims was the conflict 
among the Russian, British, and American fur traders. When the 
diplomatic conference opened, the negotiators relied upon the maps 
and charts of these fur traders for the adjudication of the claims. 
In the political action of Great Britain and Russia the fur-trading 
influence was particularly forceful, since each country was repre-
sented by powerful monopolies--the Russian American Company and the 
North West Company, which was amalgamated with the Hudson's Bay 
Company in 1821. Both of these companies maintained trading posts 
11 
on the mainland and the adJacent islands. The American fur trad-
ers, however, represented a large number of petty capitalists. This 
was true especially after the failure of Astor's Pacific Fur Com-
pany, for after 1813 American trading was exclusively maritime, 
that is, the trading was conducted aboard ship rather than at land 
bases or trading posts. 10 As a result the American traders did not 
have as strong a foundation for territorial claims north of the 
Columbia River, nor were they as influential in obtaining govern-
ment action as the British and Russian companies were. 
On July 8/20, 1819 the first charter of the Russian American 
Company expired. ll Eight years previously the Company had been 
put under the control of the Ministry of the Interior and it was 
from this oftice that the Czar had sought information on the Com-
pany's operations and from which he expected some recommendations. 
The report of the investigating committee primarily dealt with the 
loss ot trade encountered by the Company at the hands ot the Amer-
~can and British traders. Thus betore a new charter would be is-
~ued it was necessary to establish the boundaries within which the 
Company was to operate, and above all to exclude any trading ex-
cept by the Russian American Company. By the new charter granted 
10 
John S. Galbraith, The Hudson's ~i~ Companl as an Imperial 
'actor, 1821-1862 (BerkeleY;-1957), p.. -- --
11 
JUlj 8/20, 1819 indicates the combination ot Old Style and 
~ew Style dates. 
18 
September 13/25, 1821 the Russian American Company vas placed un-
der the Ministry of Finance and became a quasi-governmental body. 
The chief manager of the Company vas to be a captain of the Impe-
rial Navy vhile the other officers of the Company were to be naval 
officers. This restriction vas so placed in order to obtain a 
Company fleet, a project equally important to the Company and to 
the government. 
But nine days betore reneving the charter at the Russian Amer-
ican Company, September 4/16, 1821, Czar Alexander I issued a ukase 
by which he decreed that to Russian subJects alone vas reserved 
the right of lithe pursuits of commerce, whaling, and fishery, and 
of all other industry on all islands, posts, and gulfs, including 
the whole at the north-west coast of America, beginning from Beh-
ring Straits to the 51° at northern latitude, also trom the Aleu-
tian Islands to the eastern coast of Siberia, as vell as along the 
Kurile Islands tram Behring Straits to the south cape of the Is-
lands of Urup, Viz., to the 450 50' north latitude ••• ,,12 For-
eign vessels, moreover, vere torbidden to approach within lese 
than one hundred Italian miles ot the coasts at any point. 13 The 
12 U. S. Congress, senate, Senate Documents, No. 162, Proceed-
ings ~ the Alaska Boundarl Tribunal Convened !! London • • • under 
the Treatl Concluded at Washington, Januarl 24, 1903 ••• 58th 
cong., 2nd Sess., (WaShington, 1904), II, 25~6. Hereinafter this 
will be cited as A. B. T. 
13 An Italian mile is equal to 6,080 teet. ct. George David-
son, ~ Alaska Boundarl (San FranciSCO, 1903), p. 44, n. 2. 
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new charter issued on September 13/25, 1821 was somewhat more pre-
cise in delineating the boundaries by granting the Company: 
The privilege ot carrying on, to the exclusion of all other 
Russians, and of the subjects of foreign States, all indus-
tries, on the shores of Borth-western America which have from 
time immemorial belonged to Russia, commencing from the north-
ern point ot the Island of Vancouver, under 510 north lati-
tude to Behring Straits and beyond them, and on all the is-
lands which belong to that coast, as well as on the others 
situated between it and the eastern shore ot Siberia, and 
also on those of the Kurile Islands where the Company has 
carried on industries, as tar as the southern extremity of 
the Island of Urup under 45 0 50,.14 
Though the ukase waG aimed primarily at the elimination of Ameri-
can traders in the coastal waters of the north Pacific, it also 
was inJu~ious to the interests of the Hudson's Bay Company.15 Con-
sequently, the controversy was both over territorial sovereignty 
and maritime rights. 
Wben instructions were sent to the Russian ministers to bring 
this imperial decree to the notice of the governments concerned, 
an immediate protest was raised by the United States and Great 
Britain. Castlereagh's response was a strong warning that Britain 
was to be understood as reserving all her rights. In Washington 
John Quincy Adams informed Pierre Poletica, Russian minister at 
Washington, that the President was surprised to learn about the 
Russian claim of territory as far south as 510 north latitude. 
15 Ibid. I, Pt. II, 63-64; II, 95-97, Baron Nicolay, Russian 
Minister-at London to Marquis ot Londonderry, British Foreign Sec-
retary, October 3l/Rovember 12, 1821. 
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Before any claims would be laid to this area in the Pacific, it 
was expected that a delineation of boundaries would be effected by 
treaty between the two countries. Adams also questioned Poletica 
about the extraordinary exclusion of United States vessels beyond 
the usual territorial Jurisdiction, and wondered whether Russia 
could Justify this ukase under the laws of nations. 16 
When the Czar learned how his decree had been received by 
Great Britain and the United States, he immediately invited the 
powers concerned to discuss the matter so that some agreement 
might be reached. It should be borne in mind that, as later events 
were to prove, the Czar agreed and informed the powers indirectly 
that no attempts would be made to enforce the offending clauses of 
the ukase, but that the decree would not be withdrawn. This was 
done so that negotiations oould be held in a somewhat easy atmos-
phere. At first Alexander intended that the negotiations should 
be carried on with the American government through Pierre PoletioaJ 
but because the Russian minister became ill, he was recalled and 
was replaced by Baron Tuyll who was instructed to have the discus-
sions transferred to St. Petersburg. There was some delay in his 
arrival in America by way of London. It was during this period 
that the Russian government saw the wisdom of having the three 
countries involved meet at the Russian capital tor the settlement 
of the issue. Thus Tuyll's instructions were changed so that the 
16 Bemis, p. 496. 
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three plenipotentiaries could meet in the Russian capital. On 
February 20, 1823 powers of a plenipotentiary were issued to Sir 
Charles Bagot, while those of Henry Middleton, the American minis-
ter at st. Petersburg, vere not issued until July 18, 1823 because 
of the delay of Tuyll, and they did not reach him until October 
that year. The Russian plenipotentiaries, Count Charles Nessel-
rode, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Poletica, whose health had 
been restored, did not receive their powers until February 20, 
1824. These dates are important, for, although the negotiators 
initiated proceedings prior to the reception of the powers of the 
Russian plenipotentiaries, the.e discussions were but preliminary 
and hence not binding on any party. 
Since two of the three parties concerned were representing, 
indirectly at least, government-sponsored fur companies, it would 
be well to outline the demands of each company in the dispute. The 
Hudson's Bay Company, recently organized to include the North West 
Company whose claims in the Pacific Northwest it immediately es-
poused, under the direction of the capable John Henry Pelly, sought 
to obtain the right to trade within the area of the Fraser River 
and to force the Russian claims as far back as the ukase of Paul I 
in 1799 so that there would be some room for expansion for their 
own Company, anel that the Russians be "kept at a distance." The 
two remaining objectives of the Company were to tlsecure transit be-
tween inland territories and the Pacific Ocean" and to preserve in-
Violate "under Company control the Mackenzie River system, one of 
22 
the richest fur provinces on the continent." By the energetic ef-
fort of the British Foreign Office all these objectives were 
17 
achieved. 
If a distinction be drawn between the extreme claims in the 
ukase of 1821 and the minimum demands of the Russian American Com-
pany, no serious obstacle for a basis of agreement could be envi-
sioned. Baron Tuyll wrote to Count Nesselrode that if it were im-
possible to extend Russian frontiers farther south, it would be in-
dispensable that the frontier be fixed at least at 550 north lati-
tude, or better yet, "at the southern point of the archipelago of 
the Prince of Wales and the Observatory Inlet, which are situated 
almost under that parallel.*' If the frontier were put nearer than 
this it would encroach upon Novo-Archangelsk (Sitka) which was 
18 
tben in 570 3' north latitude. The basic objectives of the Rus-
sian }merican Company, then, were the recognition of Russian sov-
ereignty over the Prince of Wales Archipelago and over a strip on 
the continent vast enough to counteract any increase of trade by 
19 
Russia's foreign rivals. By 1821 the Hudson's Bay Company and 
the Russian American Company had not clashed at any point in the 
Pacific Northwest. The boundary dispute in which their governments 
17 Galbraith, p. 127. 
18 A. B. T., II, 113, Tuyll to Nesselrode, October 21/ Novem-
ber 2, 1822. -
19Ibid • 131-140, Poletica to Nesselrode, November 3, 1823. 
It is n~lear whether the date given is Old Style or New Style. 
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were then engaged was concerned with determining the sovereignty 
over a wilderness between the two companies I spheres of influence, 
thus providing a no-manls-land into which each hoped that it could 
20 
expand. It was mutual convenience rather than absolute right 
that served as a basis for the boundary negotiations. 
Although the objectives of both fur companies were clear in 
the minds of the respective negotiators, British and Russian, there 
was no clarity concerning the American demands, at least in the 
minds ot the British negotiators. British Foreign Secretary George 
Canning wanted to reach an agreement with the United States on the 
maritime part of the dispute, and then both would approach Russia 
for a settlement. Canning was under the misapprehension that the 
United States had no pretensions north of 510 north latitude. This 
erroneous Judgment resulted from a letter ot his cousin, Stratford 
Canning, who assumed that this was the position of the United 
States on the question. On May 3, 1823 he wrote to the Foreign 
Secretary the extraordinary statement that "He [Adam~ added that 
the United States had no territorial claims of their own as high 
as the 51st degree ot latitude ••• ,,21 Such an unqualified state-
ment easily led to a miSinterpretation. Thus on July 12, 1823 
Foreign Secretary Canning wrote to Bagot in St. Petersburg and re-
layed the information he had obtained from his cousin in 
20 
Ibid. 118, Count Lieven, Russian minister at London, to G. 
Canning, January 19/31, 1823. 
~1 
Ibid. 120, Stratford Canning to G. Canning, May 3, 1823. 
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Washington: II ••• the part ot the question in which the American 
Government is peculiarly desirous ot establishing a concert with 
this country is that which concerns the extravagant assumption of 
maritime Jurisdiction. 1I Having discussed that part, he then added: 
ttThe other part ot the question which relates to territorial claim 
22 
and boundary is perhaps susceptible ot a separate settlement." 
This statement is somehwat cautious since Canning had not been ap-
proached by Richard Rush, the American minister in London. 
In the month ot August, moreover, George Canning tailed to in-
terpret the advances of Rush, for at that time Rush claimed that 
be had not received instructions in regard to the northwest coast. 
~ence this matter fell into the background when the two negotia-
tors were discussing a possible JOint action of the United States 
~nd Great Britain in South America. By October 17/29, 1823 Sir 
~harles Bagot in a despatch to Foreign Secretary Canning had at 
~ast learned trom Henry Middleton that the United States, far trom 
~eing uninterested in the territorial assertions ot Russia, vas 
ready to assert equal claims with Great Britain to territory be-
o 23 ~ween 420 and 61 north latitude. By January 15, 1824 Foreign 
Secretary Canning was able to address himse1t to Bagot in these 
words: "I then found, what I had not betore been led to suspect, 
~hat Mr. Rush had himselt authority to enter into negotiations with 
22 
Ibid. 123-124, G. Canning to Bagot, July 12, 1823. 
23-
Ibid. 130, Bagot to G. Canning, October 17/29, 1823. 
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us as to the respective claims of Great Britain and the United 
States on the northwest coast of America, although he does not ap-
pear to have been instructed to invite such negotiations here if 
24 
we should prefer leaving it to be conducted at St. Petersburg." 
He then instructed the British minister to pursue the negotiations 
alone with Russia and sketch alternative boundaries that would be 
acceptable to Great Britain. These latter were suggested by Pelly, 
governor of the Hudson's Bay Company. In effect, Canning had been 
25 
faced with three alternatives: to come to some understanding with 
the United States and then contend with Russia over the northern 
boundary; or to allow negotiations to proceed as before in St. Pe-
tersburg; or to make the Convention of 1818 with the United States 
a tripartite agreement by which all the territory beyond the Rocky 
Mountains would be open equally to the citizens ot all three coun-
26 
tries. Since he had decided that the best solution would be a 
separate negotiation with Russia to be carried on at St. Peters-
27 
burg, our attention must now be turned to the Russian capital. 
24 ~. 144, G. Canning to Bagot, January 15, 1824. 
25Tompkins, Alaska, p. 139. 
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The Convention ot 1818, between the United States and Great 
Britain, stipulated that for ten years the whole area west ot the 
Rocky Mountains should be open to Citizens of both countries with-
out any preJudice to territorial claims ot either country. Ct. 
Treaties and Other International Acts ot the United States of Amer-
~, ed. Hunter Miller (Washington, 1931)~I, 658-661. -- ----
27Although President Monroe had enunciated the non-coloniza-
tion principle of the Monroe Doctrine on December 2, 1823, it had 
a relatively small role in the discussion of the treaties in St. 
Petersburg. Ct. A.B.T. II, 17, Middleton to Adams, February 5/17, 1824. - - -
26 
The negotiations were then begun by each country separately 
and vere carried on concurrently though independently, with little 
communication he~ween the British and American negotiators. Mid-
dleton, having begun his conferences with the Russian plenipoten-
tiariea in early April, 1824, had been instructed as early as July 
22, 1823 by Secretary of State Adams: "With regard to the territor-
ial claim ••• ve are willing to agree to the boundary line vith-
in which the Emperor Paul granted exclusive privileges to the Rus-
sian American Company, that is to say, latitude 55°." But concern-
ing Great Britain's claim, Adams added: "As the British ambassador 
at St. Petersburg is authorized and instructed to negotiate like-
wise upon this subject, it may be proper to adjust the interests 
and claims of the three powers by a joint conventlon.,,28 As soon 
es the April negotiations commenced, Middleton notified both the 
~ussian and British representatives that if they tried to negoti-
ate on territorial questions without taking cognizance of the Amer-
ican claims, he would be forced to protest such an arrangement. 
Middleton and the Russian representatives proceeded with their 
~onferences without any difficulties. The American minister of-
~ered the Russians recognition or the fifty-fifth degree parallel 
of north latitude as the boundary, if Russia in turn would abrogate 
Ivhe offensive maritime restriction of the ukase of 1821 and would 
~rant trading privileges along the coast. In early April a 
28 
~. 47-51, Adams to Middleton, July 22, 1823. 
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satistactory treaty was concluded. Further negotiations brought 
an agreement that the Prince ot Wales Island should belong wholly 
to Russia, thus placing the parallel ot 540 40' as the southern 
limit ot Russian occupation or settlement and the northern limit 
ot occupation by American citizens. All the area ot the north 
Pacitic Ocean was to be open to the subjects ot both powers tor 
trading and tishing, provided that they were not to resort to any 
part ot the coast occupied by the other power without permission. 
For a period ot ten years the ships ot both countries were to be 
allowed treedom to trequent the coastal waters. A turther stipu-
lation was that trattic in tirearms and liquor to the natives was 
torbidden. 29 By April 17, 1824 a tinal agreement was reached and 
the two countries signed the convention. 
The conterence between Bagot and the Russian plenipotentiar-
ies began on February 28, 1824 and ran concurrently with the Russo· 
American negotiations. Besides a lack ot cordiality between the 
two sides, two terms agreed upon by Russia and the United States 
hampered the attainment ot the extreme pretensions ot the Hudson's 
Bay Company which Bagot sought. The tirst ot these was the accept-
ance of 540 40' north latitude as the Russian southern boundary. 
The second was that the United States was willing to bypass their 
extreme pretensions it the Russians would yield trading concessio~ 
Thus Bagot was torced to accept the boundary line. Yet Great 
29 
Treaties, ed. Miller (Washington, 1933), III, 151-155. 
28 
Britain could afford to yield this point without giving up the se-
curity of the Hudson's Bay Company, whereas Russia could not af-
ford to make concessions without the risk of endangering her own 
interests. Because both sides were obstinate in their demands, 
the discussion was prolonged. The Russian plenipotentiaries did 
concede one point, however, and by doing so weakened the position 
of the Russian American Company whose interests they represented, 
for they agreed to permit the British to enter freely the interior 
on all rivers that emptied into the ocean through the coastal stril 
opposite the Alexander Archipelago. As later events proved, this 
concession only inspired the Hudson's Bay Company with the idea of 
establishing interior posts and thus cut off a considerable portion 
of the RUSSian fur trade at its source, since the coast Indians 
with whom the Russians traded received their furs from the Indians 
of the interior. When this concession was offered, the Hudson's 
Bay Company had not indicated a desire to enter the maritime fur 
trade. Free naVigation of the coast was incorporated in the 
Anglo-Russian convention because it had been obtained by the United 
States, and because the British whaling interests had represented 
30 
their proposals to the Foreign Office. 
By April, 1824 the Russian and British negotiators had reached 
an agreement on the boundary issue. Final settlement had to be 
postponed for ten months, however, because of disputes over 
30 
Galbraith, p. 131. 
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rights of trade and navigation by British subjects, who wanted the 
right in perpetuity to trade at Sitka, to navigate along the coast 
o 
from Portland Canal to 60 north latitude, and to visit the terri-
tory north of this parallel under certain stipulations. Russia,on 
the other hand, agreed to half of this proposal by conceding the 
privileges of navigation south of 600 north latitude for only ten 
years, but refused to concede any privileges north of that parallel 
~urther ~iscussion took place over the east and west boundaries, 
~he results of which were incorporated into the treaty signed on 
February 28, 1825. By this treaty Russia and Great Britain, now 
represented by Stratford Canning in place of Bagot, agreed that the 
boundary between their territories in the PacifiC Northwest would 
~egin at the most southern point of Prince of Wales Island, in 540 
~O' north latitude, and this boundary followed the Portland Canal 
~o its head at 560 north latitude. From the point where the line 
ntersected the 141st meridian it was projected on that degree to 
whe Arctic Ocean. British subjects were to enjoy the privilege of 
~rading at Sitka for ten years, Just as were the Americans. They 
~ere, moreover, permitted to trade in the Russian coastal waters 
outh of Mount St. Elias for the same period of time. Above all, 
he British were granted the right in perpetuity to travel into 
nd from the interior on the rivers that flowed into the ocean 
31 




From the discussion of the preliminaries and the final agree-
ment in these two treaties it is apparent that the negotiators had 
argued much to obtain the rights and privileges granted. Yet the 
Hudson's Bay Company was not satisfied. Indeed, the British gov-
ernment had ably and skilfully handled the interests of the Compa-
ny in the negotiations and even obtained a right of traveling on 
the interior rivers, which had not been sought by the Company; 
now, however, the Company saw its chance to obtain a monopoly of 
the fur trade between Mount St. Elias and California. To attain 
this end the Russian and American traders must be eliminated. 
Since the Russian American Company confined its activities chiefly 
to offshore islands and collected sea-otter skins and fur seals, 
while the Hudson's Bay Company collected land pelts, there was no 
need for immediate elimination of the Russians. It was principal-
ly against the American petty traders that the Hudson's Bay Com-
pany turned its efforts. The task was not too difficult since the 
Americans aided in their own elimination in as much as many had 
suffered ruin already and the rest made little profit. Once the 
Americans had been eliminated, the British Company would seek to 
do the same to the Russians. 
Ironically similar plans were in the minds of the directors 
of the Russian American Company_ Although it was true that their 
government had conceded the privilege of trading and navigating 
in Russian waters to both of their competitors, the directors 
hoped that after the ten-year period elapsed, the entire north 
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Pacific would become a ~ clausum under the dominion of the Czar, 
and thus obtain what Russia originally had asserted in the ukase 
of 1821. Two inCidents, one involving the United ~tates, the othe 
reat Britain, point out that this was Russia's ultimate intention. 
On April 17, 1834 the ten-year clause granting the rlgat to 
the United States to navigate and trade along the Russian waters 
xpired. That very day trouble arose in aussian America. Two 
merican traders, Captains Snow and Allen, were then in Sitka and 
penly told the Russians of their intentions of trading along the 
o 
oast above 54 40'. Baron Ferdinand Wrangell, the governor of 
he Russian American Company, prohibited them from such action, 
tating that the ten-year period had expired and thus the privi-
ege was no longer open to American traders. Both captains re-
used to acquiesce in this prohibition and went ahead anyway. 
hereupon Wrangell appealed to the State Department. Nevertheless, 
he United States countered that the article be renewed by a con-
ention and suggested the terms. Tbe Russian foreign ministry 
eSitated, however, stating that the interests of the Russian Amer-
can Company would have to be respected, and that no reply could 
e given until its governor, Wrangell, returned to St. Petersburg. 
is arrival did not occur until the summer of 1836. A few months 
ster another incident occurred. An American ship, the Loriot, 
the command of Captain Blinn, was ordered by Russian warships 
o turn back to Forrester's Island. Blinn then returned to his 
tarting-point in the Sandwich Islands and turned in a complaint, 
32 
declaring that he had a right to land on unoccupied territory by 
reason of Article I even though the ten years had expired. When 
Nesselrode was notified of this claim, his reply was that since 
Article I was conditioned by Article IV which limited the privi-
leges to ten years, the Russian warships had not violated the 
32 
agreement. 
To this assertion Dallas, the American minister at St. Peter~ 
burg, replied that, "By agreeing not to form new establishments 
north of latitude 540 40', the United States made no acknowledg-
ment of the right of Russia to the territory above that line. If 
such an admission had been made, Russia, • • • must have equally 
acknowledged the right of the United States to the territory south 
of the parallel." Conclusive proof that Russia did not so under-
stand the article was eVidenced by her having entered into a "sim-
ilar agreement in her subsequent treaty of 1825, with Great Brit-
ain, and having, in that instrument, acknowledged the right of 
33 
possession of the same territory by Great Britain." A final set-
tlement on this issue was not reached, although a few more notes 
were exchanged. Neither the Americans nor the British were willins 
to yield, thus raising a case of interpretation which was never 
resolved. 
Yet a similar inCident, this one involving Great Britain, 
32 U. S. Congress, Senate, Senate Documents, No.1, 25th Cong., 
3rd Sess. (Washington, 1839), Nesselrode to Dallas, February 23, 
~838, pp. 58-60. 
33 Ibid. Dallas to Nesselrode, March 5/17, 1838. DD. 64-65. 
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resulted in a definite agreement between the London and St. Peters-
burg governments. On June 18, 1834 the Dryad, under the command of 
Captain Kipling arrived at the mouth of the Stikine River. Chief 
Factor John McLoughlin of the Hudson's Bay Company had been ordered 
by the governor and its committee to build a post up the Stikine 
River, whose harbor was in Russian territory. It was to be built 
about ten leagues up, in British territory. The ultimate purpose 
seems to have been twofold: 1) to eliminate the main source of 
most of the land furs, and 2) to establish superior competition 
with the Russian American Company espeCially by obtaining the furs 
from the interior Indians rather than buying them from the coastal 
Indians. Yet it was not the intention of the Hudson's Bay Company 
to destroy the Russian American Company, but only to establish for 
34 
itself a monopoly south of Mount St. Elias. Wrangell was suspi-
cious even betore the expedition in the Dryad arrived, and he had 
built a tort at the harbor so that the British would be forced to 
ask his permission to sail up the river according to the treaty of 
1825 as he interpreted it. The Russian governor refused this per-
mission to the British ship which was forced to return to Fort Van-
couver. Chief Factor McLoughlin appealed to Pelly who in turn 
filed a protest in the Foreign Office. As a result the Company 
claimed a twenty-two thousand pound loss against the Russian Amer-
1cen Company_ When Nesselrode disclaimed Wrangell's action, the 
two companies met, and instead of presentin~,. ~3~1,~~) 
( .,- LO rJl..t, 
31lt, 4. \ UI'IIVERSITY I~Galbraith, p. 1 8. 
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and grievances through their respective governments, they negotia-
ted privately. Pelly and Simpson, overseas governor of the Bud-
sou's Bay Company, went to St. Petersburg, though the final agree-
ment was reached in Hamburg, on February 6, 1839. Since each of 
the main points of agreement affect the future Russian policy in 
Russian America, and are one of the basic reasons for the United 
States buying the territory, it would be well to outline them. 
For a period or ten years the Russian American Company leased 
to the Hudson's Bay Company from June 1, 1840 the coastal strip on 
the mainland north of Cape Spencer for an annual rent of two thou-
sand seasoned land otter skins from the west side of the Rocky 
Mountains. The Russian American Company further promised that if 
war were to break out, a three month notice would be given to the 
British company to evacuate the territory. The Hudson's Bay Com-
pany, on the other hand, agreed to provide the Russians with food 
supplies for the period of the contract as well as to transport 
English manufactured goods which the Russians desired at the rate 
of thirteen pounds per ton. The British Company also withdrew its 
35 
claims for losses incurred in the Dryad incident of 1834. Within 
two decades the impact of this agreement would be felt on the 
Pacific Northwest. 
From the above exposition it is clear that Russia's preten-
sions in the north Pacific were being closely checked by Great 
35Ibid • 154: cf. A. B ~09 212 f h f 11 t t • . T.,  - or t e u ex. 
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Britain and the United States. To safeguard her interests and 
rights here Russia was forced to reliuguish her laisse~-faire poli 
cy and to adopt a policy ot active interest in her possessions. 
Within twenty-tive years after the formation ot the Russian Ameri-
can Company, Russia had signed tvo treaties, one with the United 
states, the other with Great Britain. Although the St. Peter~burg 
government atterwards tried to reaffirm the policy of a closed sea, 
Russia was unsuccesstul, tor the two powers with interests therein 
would not forego any claims which they had so far been able to 
establish. 
CHAPTER III 
RUSSIA'S CHANGE OF ATTITUDE TOWARDS RUSSIAN AMERICA 
As the loss of the Amur River Valley had forced Russia to 
chauge her foreign policy and expand northwards, so also the Crime-
an War forced the Russian government to realize that the colonies 
in North America were vulnerable to attack. In 1841 Sir George 
Simpson, the overseas governor of the Hudson's Bay Company and Ad-
olph Etholine, governor of the Russian American Company, conversed 
in Sitka about the absurdity of the two companies attacking each 
other in case of war. This was especially so since the war might 
be fought over issues extremely remote from the northwest coast. 
Hence Simpson suggested that each company exert its influence over 
its government to neutralize the northwest coast from the area of 
conflict. 
This proposal, originally made in 1841, was adopted at the 
outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854. The conversation of the two 
men had been transcribed, so that when the directors of the Rus-
sian American Company on February 14, 1854 wrote to London asking 
the Hudson's Bay Company to induce the British government to neu-
tralize the northwest coast, they were able to cite the verbal un-
derstanding that had previously been arranged. On March 22, 1854 
36 
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the Budson's Bay Company, on the advice of the Foreign Office, 
agreed to the proposal of the Russian American Company with regard 
~o land areas alone, and further cautioned that the English fleet 
maintained the right to capture any Russian ship in the North Pa-
cific and to blockade the Russian American ports. 
Bveu before the directors wrote to London, the first intima-
tiOD of a proposed sale of Russian America was made. Fearing that 
Great Britain might seize the Russian colonies, P. S. Kostromitinov, 
the Vice-Consul of the Russian American Company in San Francisco, 
devised a fictitious sale at the colonies to the American Russian 
Commercial Company of San Francisco. On January 18/30, 1854 the 
contract in draft form vas sent to Edward de Stoeckl, Russian mi~-
iater in Washington, for approval. He, in turn, consulted William 
Marcy, Secretary of State, and Senator Willia~ Owin of California. 
They advised Stoeckl that Great Britain would see through this ruse 
and would never respect it. These abortive negotiations were held 
prior to those between the Hudsou's Bay Company and the Russian 
American Company and their representatives in London and St. Petere-
burg. When the neutrality agreement became known, the fictitious 
proposal of selling the colonies no longer was discussed. 
Although the exact situation was not known, newspapers began 
'(;0 circulate rumors that Russia was willing to sell Russian America. 
By repeated efforts eventually they were able to convince a numbe~ 
of people of the truth of their assertions. Believing in these 
38 
rumors, Gwln and Marcy approached Stoeckl on the subJect. The Rus-
sian minlster had known ot the reports, but attirmlng that they 
1 
~ere certainly not true, he asked them to torget about it. 
An interesting light is cast on these inquiries by Stoeck1 in 
~ letter whleh he addressed to Prince Alexander Gorehakov, the Rus-
sian Foreign Secretary. To Stoeck1 lt did not seem strange that 
preat Britain should have acquiesced so readily to the neutrality 
agreement of 1854. The secret motlve behind the Brltish move was 
~hat the London government was avare ot the rumor at Russia's in-
tentlon to sell the co10nles to the United States; and so, in order 
to prevent them tram tal1ing lnto American possession, Great Brit-
aln agreed. This information Stoeckl asserted he received trom 
~arcy who assured him that "the English legation in Washington was 
pn the alert to know whether there were really any question ot the 
2 
sale of our colonies "co the Americans." 
Immedlate1y upon the close at the Crimean War and the conclu-
, 
sian ot the Peace of Paris, the problem of the future destiny ot 
the Russian colonles once more erose. It was clear that lt Russia 
vould engage in war with a naval power, the eolonles in North Amer-
ica were defenseless. Nor did St. Petersburg have the assurance 
that another neutrallty agreement could be reached. Bence, the 
1 
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problem had to be discussed and solved. 
Since the colonies could not be protected sufficiently, the 
best solution seemed to be to sell them. This proposal was urged 
by Grand Duke Constantine Nicholaevich, brother of Czar Alexander 
II, in a letter dated December 7/19, 1856 to Prince Gorchakov. 
Suggesting that the colonies be sold to the United States, the 
Grand Duke contended that since the colonies were of little value 
to Russia, and since there was a great lack of money in the treas-
ury, Russia could profit from the sale. Furthermore, the United 
States needed the territory to round out its holdings on the Pacif-
ic. Besides these proposals he also recommended that an inspection 
be made of the Company administration in Russian America so that 
the government could ascertain the extent to which the Company had 
been beneficial to the inhabitants, and also so that it might pre-
pare a revision of the Company's charter. 
Prince Gorchakov showed the note to the Czar and shortly 
thereafter in his reply to the Grand Duke agreed to the proposals, 
but emphasized that secrecy must be kept. He further suggested 
that Stoeckl should discreetly approach the State Department on 
this question of a possible sale, and that a commission be sent to 
Russian America before the expiration of the charter of the Com-
pany. No final decision would be made until the reports of Stoeckl 
3 
and the commission had reached St. Petersburg. 
3Victor J. Farrar, The Annexation of Russian America to the 
United States (Washington-,-1937), pp. 4=;. -- ---
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In a memorandum dated April 29/May 11, 1857, Gorchakov in. 
formed the Grand Duke that the Mlnlstry of Forelgn Affairs shared 
his idea of selling Russian America to tbe United States, but urged 
that the greatest secrecy be maintained so that this vould not be 
detrimental to the Russian American Company. In addition Stoeckl 
was to be advised that the cession vas to be limited to those lands 
which lay in North America, since the Aleutian and Kurl1e Islands 
could remain in the posseSSion of Russia through the Russian Ameri-
can Company for its operatlons in Slberia. The sale should be made 
in a little over four years-.vhen the charter vould expire-wand the 
purchase price should be 7,442,800 silver rubles, vith the govern-
4 
ment and the Company equally dlviding this amount. 
At some time during 1858-1859 Stoeckl vas ln Russia on vaca-
" 
tion. During his interviev vith Gorchakov the Russian minister vas 
instructed verbally that if the United States should make another 
move to purchase the territory the proposal should be considered 
seriously. By late 1859 such a move vas made from an unexpected 
quarter. On December 23, l859/January 4, 1860 Stoeckl reported to 
Gorchakov that Gvin had approached him recently on the proposal of 
buying Russian America and assured him that the President vas read~ 
5 
to buy. Basically Gvin argued that the colonies vere so far from 
4 ~. 6-7. 
5 Victor J. Farrar, "Joseph Lane McDonald and the Purchase of 
Alaska," WHQ, XII (April 1921), 84. For details of Gvin's rela-
tions vith McDonald, a California entrepreneur, see belov pp. 55-
56. 
Russia that the latter could never possibly exploit the resources 
of those colonies. The nearness ot the United States would deti-
nitely be an advantage for such exploitation. Stoeckl replied eva-
sively and stated that he did not knov the views ot his government 
and that he was limited to submitting the proposal to the Prince. 
Gwin in turn answered that he would again conter with President 
Buchanan and inform Stoeckl ot the results. 
Some time aftervards Gvin again called on Stoeckl and told 
him that the President agreed to the nonofticial character ot the 
proceedings. Hence communications were not to be sent through the 
oftice ot Secretary of State Cass, but only ot Undersecretary 
Appleton. A tev days later Stoeckl received a visit trom the un-
dersecretary who informed him that he had spoken to President Bu-
chanan. Appleton reiterated Gwints contentions and added that be-
fore taking further steps it vas necessary to ascertain Russia's 
views on this proposal. It an attirmative reply would be made, 
Appleton promised Stoeckl that the President would consult with his 
Cabinet about the proposal and then set the conditions upon which 
the negotiations would be executed. Stoeckl answered Appleton by 
stating that Russia'S answer, whatever it was, must not be consid-
ered as a proposition to sell the colonies, since the United States 
had initiated the idea ot a possible purchase. To this Gwin and 
Appleton both agreed. Before the conference ended, Stoeckl casual-
ly asked about a possible purchase price. The ofter made was tive 
million dollars. Stoeckl then assured them that he would consult 
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Gorchakov about this matter and then tell them about the rePly.6 
The response of the Russian Foreign Secretary, however, was 
not so encouraging. Gorchakov, in a despatch that reached America 
in the summer of 1860, stated that the offer was not what might 
have been expected. The Russian government would reflect maturely 
on the proposal, but would not render a final decision until the 
Minister of Finance had finished his report on the financial con-
dition of the colonies. Adding a personal note of his own, the 
Prince pointed out that alienating the Russian possessions would 
not prove beneficial to Russia politically, but that the only con-
sideration which could turn the scales would be a financial advan-
tage which certainly was not found in the American offer of five 
million dollars. Gorchakov concluded his remarks by asking Stoeckl 
to tell Gwin and Appleton that the sum offered was not considered 
to be "an equitable equivalent. n7 
Before further negotiations could be transacted, the North ano 
South were fighting a civil war in the United States. World events 
so far had disclosed the fact that the United States had begun to 
play a significant part in the maintenance of a European balance 
of power with respect to European colonies. That Russia should 
6 Stoeckl to Gorchakov, December 23, 1859/January 4, 1860, ed. 
McPherson, PHR, III, 84-85. 
7U• S. Congress, House, House Executive Documents, Vol. 13, 
No. 177, "Message from the President ot the United States ••• 
transmitting correspondence in relation to Russian America," 40th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, 1868), pp. 133-134. 
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have sided with the North while Great Britain sided with the South 
was naturally expected as an effect of the chain of events that had 
occurred. Since Lincoln's proclamation of April 19, 1861 announc-
ing the blockade of Southern ports seriously affected British 
shipping, Great Britain and France recognized the Confederate 
states as belligerents. This resulted in strained diplomatic re-
lations between the two countries and the North. Russia$ however, 
from the outset of the war supported the Union, especially since 
this would be another opportunity to weaken British maritime pover. 
Stoeckl went as far as to berate the Southern leaders and even at-
tempted to bring about a reconciliation between the opponents. 8 
Corchakov ex~ended to Cassius Clay, the American minister at St. 
Petersburg, the assurance of Russian friendship, and supported 
this by granting American vessels the privilege of bringing prizes 
of war into Russian ports. 9 Russia's show of friendship seems to 
have been an important factor in avoiding British and French inter-
vention. 
Although Russia's position significantly restrained British 
maritime power, especially in the outbreak of the war, Czar Alex-
snder II, nonetheless, was left with no other alternative. Similar 
8 
Frank A. Golder, I'The American Civil War through the Eyes of 
a Russian Diplomat," ABR, XXVI (April 1921), 454-463. 
9MS • Despatches, Russia, XVIII, April 8/21, 1861, State De-
partment, quoted in Benjamin P. Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 
1815-1867, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Po-
litical Science, Vol. XLVIII (Baltimore, 1930), p. 126. 
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problems faced Russia and the United States. As the North heard 
the Southern cries of secession and the bombardment ot Fort Sumter, 
Russian Poland vas also undergolng tempestuous tlmes in their 
struggle for independence from the autocratic Czar. This movement 
was encouraged by Great Britain and France, since both states had 
granted Russian Poland some autonomy in the Congress of Vienna in 
1815. But Russia countered that the affair was entirely domestic. 
~ence Russia could not have allied herself to Great Britain and 
'rance on the side of the South when across the globe the Czarist 
government found itself in serlous opposltion to them. 
Slnce RUSSia had been so cooperatlve toward the North, Secre-
tary of State William B. Seward reCiprocated in May, 1863 by refus-
lng to partlcipate in a proposed French intervention with Great 
10 
Britain to check Czar Alexander in the Polish Rebel110n. Also 
coupled to the Polish question vas the Visit of the Russian fleet 
to the United States in the fall of 1863, tor in September part of 
the fleet appeared in Hew York harbor and a month later another 
part appeared in San 'rancisco harbor. Throughout the Korth vild 
applause greeted the arrival of these two fleets. The popular 
belief vas that the Russians had come to assist the North in case 
the Union vere attacked by France or Great Britain. Some citizens 
asserted that some agreement actually existed between the two 
governments. Another legend then clrculating was that the 
10 Barold I. Blinn, "Seward and the Pollsh aebellion of 1863," 
~, XLV (July 1940), 828-833. 
fleet was sent to this COUll try with I'secret ordEn's1' tha-;; in case of 
European intervention tbe fleet would be placed at the disposal of 
the :luion. Such rumors have since been proved entirely gl'ound-
11 
less. 
The facts are that when the Polish controversy had reached a 
critical stage in the sammer of 1863, Alexander II was determined 
~ot to yield. By skilful maneuvering he ordered the fleet out or 
the Russian ports where, it war broke out, it might be trapped 
either by British ships or by ice. If the Russian ships were in 
friendly ports 01' on the high seas, they would be more able to in .. 
flict damage on British ehipping. In tact llhen the Rt4ssian fleets 
srrived in the United States the possibility of European interven-
12 
tion rea~ly had subsided. Consequent~y Russian policy during the 
American Civil War was one of self-interest which asserted that a 
United States strong and undivided must act as a balance against 
British power. 
Aftcu' the surrender of the Confederate States at Appomattox 
Courthouse in April, 1865 the restored Union now faced the over-
whelm1ng problems ot reconstruction. While these domestic issues 
"lere being solved, Seward. va6 alao bus~' in international affairs. 
11 Frank Pu Go~der, II The Ru.ssian Fleet and the American Civil 
'iar, It ABR ... XX{July 1915), 807-808. Another study... carr1ed on vi tIl ... 
out cognizance of Golder's 'irork, is E. A. Adamov, !!Ru3sia and the 
United States at the Time of the Civil v!ar," Journal of Modern IUs-
tory, II(Deeember 1930), 586-602. The entire ques"'icuilias been -
scrutinized again 1n Thomas A. Bailef, "The Russian Fleet Myth Re-
examined,!> ~, XXXVIII (June 1951), 81-90. 
12Thomas, p. 139. 
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;Sesides uis gro't-rinc interest in the Far East Seward 1fa3 trying to 
se-ttle the .A,laba.r!!!. claims. Although this problem. was not adjudi-
cated until 1870 by the Treaty of Washington and the subsequent 
Geueva Arbitration jl.'lrlards, the Secretary of State kept iUlliatinc 
upon America' s c1air1s agains't Great :3r1 te.in. He vas n,:"t willing 
to let the British Foreign Office forget the depredations of the 
Alabama and other Contederate cruisers. 
While this topic was occupying his mind, Sevard was shortly 
presented vith a newer problem by Stoeckl, the Russian minister. 
In the winter of 1866-1867 Stoeck1 returned to St. Petersburg on a 
leave of absence seemingly with the purpose of relinquishing his 
post and of getting another diplomatic assignment at the Hague. 
Since he had played an intimate part in some preliminary negotia-
tions for the sale ot the Russian colonies, the government called 
upon him to sit in the deliberations of a committee called to de-
cide the future of these possessions. By now the Russian American 
pompany was drifting towards bankruptcy so that without an annual 
~overnment subsidy of two hundred thousand rubles the directors 
eould not possibly succeed in governing the territory. At the com-
nittee meeting held on December 16/28, 1866 Czar Alexander II pre-
sided. In attendance were Prince Gorchakov, Grand Duke eouaten-
~ine, Vice-Adairel Krabbe, Minister of the Marine, and Stoeckle 
~he final decision of the group vas that the colonies should be 
~old. The Czar turned to Staackl and asked him to go to Washington 
'to conclude the deal. Not having much choice in the matter, the 
Russian minister acquiesced. 
In February, 1867 Stoackl arrived in New York City. It was 
not until mid-March, however, that he reached Washington. When he 
called upon Seward, he broached the matter delicately. Although 
there is no official account of the oeeting, it seems that Stoeckl 
opened the conversation by stating his regrets that he could not 
grant the concessions asked for by Cassius Clay, the American min-
ister at St. Petersburg, on behalf of certain Californians. Seward 
then told Stoeckl that he also had a favor to ask on behalf of some 
citizens in Washington Territory who had petitioned for fisheries 
13 
rights. To this Stoeckl replied that the Russian government 
could not possibly grant it. Seward countered by asking outright 
if Russia were willing to sell Russian America to the United 
States. At last the Russian minister had gained his objective of 
having the initiative for the purchase come from the United States. 
President Andrew Johnson was then approached by Seward who ~ fav 
days later again met vith Stoeckl and told him that the President 
was willing to pay five million dollars. This was not agreeable 
to Stoeckl since he had been instructed to get at least six millio~ 
five hundred thousand dollars. 
Some controversy over the terms then took place. By March 25 
l3The interest of Cassius M. Clay and some citizens of the 
~ashington Territory in the purchase vill be examined in the fol-
lowing chapter. 
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staeckl vas able to inform the Czar by cable that the United States 
had raised its offer to seven million dollars, provided that the 
sale would not be burdened by any reservations or privileges grant-
ad by the Russian American Company or RU6Bia itself. Furthermore 
Seward had insisted that the payment should be made in New York and 
uot in London and also agreed to add tvo hundred thousand dollars 
14 
-to the purchase price if Staeckl would agree to this proposal. 
The Russian minister vas amenable to this offers but he had not yet 
received his povers asp~nipotent1Bry. Sevard urged Stoeckl to ob-
tain these powers by cable so that the treaty could be submitted 
to the Senate which soon would be adjourning. 
Late in the evening of March 29, Staeckl received the necessa-
~y authority as he and the Secretary of State were spending the 
~vening informally. Not willing to wait until morning office hours, 
they summoned their aides and dre'" up the treaty of cession. By 11_ 
A. M. the treaty was finished. The proceedings vere reported to 
St. Petersburg by cable and a summary of the treaty was transcribed 
Dver the wires. The very next day the treaty was presented to Sen-
~tor Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
iittee. Sevard was not going to waste a moment. By April 9, with-
n ten days of the signing of the agreement, the Senate ratified 
~he treaty by a vote of thirty-seven to two. On May 10 the treaty 
14 
U. S. Congresn, House, House Executive Documents, Papers 
Relating .!2. Foreifn Affairs: Diplomatic Correspondence, 40th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. Washington, 1868), Vol. 1, Pt. I, No.1, p.399. 
was ratified by Czar Alexander II. Thus another outstanding real 
estate transaction in world history was accomplished for the price 
of two cents per acre. 
During this period the familiar phrases: II Seward's icebox, ,! 
If \-lalrussia," tf Johnson' s polar garden, II and others were being broad .. 
15 
cast through some of the newspapers. Although at the beginning 
the treaty met opposition both from some of the general public and 
even from the Senate, it is curious to note a remark made by Secre-
tary of the Navy Gideon Welles. A staunch opponent of Seward, even 
'though both served on the same Cabinet, Welles comments in his 
Diary on Friday, March 15, "Seward produced a treaty for acquiring 
the Russian possessions in North America. All assented to submit-
ting it to the Senate." Four days later he stated, "Had the Rus-
sian treaty on the tapis. No division of opinion as to the mea-
16 
sure." In both instances Welles records that there was no dis-
sension in the Cabinet about the proposed purchase. This is quite 
remarkable in the light of the OPPOSition later voiced against Sew-
ardis other schemes for expansion. 
In brief then, Russia began to change her attitude towards 
15New York Herald, April 12, 1867, quoted in Thomas A. Bailey, 
"Why the United States Purchased Alaska," PHR, III (March 1934), p. 
42. The article is a study of the oppositIOn of the press. 
16Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy 
under Lincoln and Johnson, ed. Howard K. Beale {Nel'l York-;-1960), 
III, 66; 68. ---
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Russian America as a result of the Crimean War. Because there was 
threat of bankruptcy in the Russian American Company and because 
the colonies were becoming defenseless against an attacker, Russia 
Bold Russian America to the United States. 
CHAPTER IV 
BANKS' FIRST FOUR REASONS EXAMINED 
Up to this point the background of the purchase has been ex-
amined in detail. To some extent Russia's Far Eastern policy as 
it affected Russian America has also been studied. The conflicts 
of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia in the north Pacif-
ic area have been reviewed. This was followed by the solution on 
Russia's part through eventual sale of Russian America to the Uni-
ted States. Yet why did the United States purchase the territory? 
This question cannot be answered as readily. 
Before attempting to study the reasons offered for the pur-
chase, it seems proper to discuss the historical framework in which 
this new territorial acquisition occurred. Was there any settle-
ment for expansion after the Civil War? To anyone who for the firm 
time realizes the fact that the United States purchased territory 
so soon after the Civil War, it must seem strange that such an a-
~ount of money could be made available towards such a purchase. 
This is especially true when it is noted that economic distress 
~sually is a concomitant result of war. 
In the years following the Civil War a number of attempts were 
uade to effect annexation of noncontiguous territories to the 
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~)2 
~,mi ted Ste tea. The Re::;Hi.blican Party, the tioninating force in. the 
post Civil War period, was traditionally Bntl-expancionist. A 
partial reason for this position was the struggle over the slav-
cry question that had raged betore the war, for newly acquired 
terri tories might mean neV' states e1 ther the slave or an'ci-slave 
states. Lest the equilibrium be disturbed, expansion became a. 
dormant issue. Atter the war some political figures atte~pted to 
revive the issue but with only a modicum of success, tor, bardened 
with a tremendous debt, and struggling with the problems of a pos-
sible depression, the nation was scarcely villing to spend enor-
:!10US sums on proJects ot expansion that would iuevi tably add to 
the existing problems. 
One trace of expansionist sentiment is found, nonetheless, 1m-
mediately upon the termination of the Civil War. This "'as the be-
lief expressed in many newspapers that Canada should be annexed to 
the United States. In South Carolina the Charlestion Daill Courier 
predicted that, "The day may not be far distant when Canada shall 
1 
form one of the Commonwealths of this great Republic." Other pa-
pers joined in this sentiment; for instance, the Chicago Trib~ne, 
the Cincinnati ~aJll Commercial, the New ~ Times, the New York 
~r1bune, and the Boston Sundaz ~imes~ When the British Parliament 
IJulY 29, 1865" "Canada and Annexation,," quoted in Dona.ld Lit. 
Dozer, II Anti-Expttnsionism During the Johnson Adlllinistration, I" f.!!!" 
XII (June 194 3), 255. 
2 
~. 255, n. 11. 
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passed the British North America Act in March, 1867 by which the 
Canadian provinces were consolidated for the purpose of administra-
tion, an outcry was raised by the press. On the thirtieth day of 
the same month, Seward was able to announce to the press the sign-
ing of the treaty of the acquisition of Alaska. In doing so the 
Secretary of State capitalized on the Canadian annexation sentiment 
by declaring that annexing Alaska would mean the eventual annexing 
3 
of Canada. 
Although Seward's prophecy never materialized, the purchase of 
Alaska did result in an outburst of expansionist sentiment by the 
American public. The doctrine of "manifest destiny" was now re-
vived and the press took up the battle cry. Some of the editors 
foretold that the Speaker of the House of Representatives would 
soon be calling upon members from Cuba, Mexico, Jamaica, Quebec, 
4 
and others to serve on the Bouse Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
Suph boasting, hovever,did not accomplish anything, for of all the 
territories Seward sought to obtain, including the Danish West In-
d1es, the island of San Domingo, and Samana Bay, the only purchase 
that was approved vas that of Alaska. Hence, even though a burst 
of expansionist sentiment had been aroused by the purchase of Alas-
ka, at the same time a clamor against Johnson and his ministers was 
3cr• James M. Callahan, Americo-Canadian Relations Concerning 
Annexation, 1849-1871, Indiana University Studies in American Hist-
ory, Vol. XII (Bloomington, 1925), pp. 199-202. 
4 
Dozer, ~, XII, 261-262. 
also raised to defeat any attempts at further territorial gains. 
Although the Senate ratified the treaty Oll April 9, l86'{ and 
the territory had been handed over to the United States in October, 
the House of Representatives did not pass the appropriation mea-
aure until July of the following year. During this period the 
chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Nathaniel P. 
Banks, was called upon to express his opinion on the proposed ap-
propriation for the purchase. In the report favoring the bill be-
fore the committee, he stated: 
The mystery which was supposed to attend this cession 
has been dispelled, and the motives of the parties presenting 
it to the government have been satisfactorily explained. They 
were, first, the laudable desire of citizens of the Pacific 
coast to share in the prolific fisheries of the oceans, seas, 
bays, and rivers of the western world; the refusal of Russia 
to renew the charter of the Russian American Fur Company in 
1866; the friendship of Russia for the United States; the ne-
cessity of preventing the transfer, by any possible chance of 
the northwest coast of America to an unfriendly power; the 
creation of new industrial interests on the Pacific necessary 
to the supremacy of our empire on the sea and land; and, fi-
nally, to facilitate and secure the advantages of an unlimited 
American commerce with the friendly powers of Japan and 
China. 5 
Although Banks affirms that the motives have been "satisfactorily 
explained," conflicting opinions have been offered since then. In 
order to solve this problem of motivation it would be well to study 
each of these reasons separately. Only then can some conclusions 
be drawn. 
The first reason as stated by Banks is "the desire of citizens 
5 
House Report, No. 37, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 11. 
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of the Pacific coast to share in the prolific fisheries of the 
oceans, seas, bays, and rivers of the western world." This reason 
is rejected by Henry W. Clark in his Historl of Alaska by his 
statement that the Washington memorial for fishery privileges was 
the work of an isolated crank· and the fur privileges were the work 6 . 
of a company of exploiters. Upon careful examination, however, 
he seems to have overlooked certain points. Banks does not claim 
~hat the whole Pacific coast was asking for such privileges, but 
affirms that "citizens of the Pacific coast" were. In order to as-
certain the identity of the citizens that Banks had in mind it 
will be necessary to recall the beginnings of the purchase move-
mente 
An Irish immigrant, Joseph Lane McDonald emigrated to the 
United States about 1834 and eventually went to California in 1859. 
His primary purpose seems to have been to establish a fishery busi-
ness, but as the California vaters offered no financially sound 
prospect, he turned his attention to the vaters off Washington, 
~ritish Columbia, and Alaska. Here he found that Americans were 
no longer permitted to make landings on Russian possessions since 
Article IV of the treaty of 1824 had expired. In the fall of 1859 
be returned to San Francisco where he formed a company which would 
have access to the peninsula of Alaska. It is certain that he did 
not intend to ask tor the p'ilrchase of Alaska, but only sought to 
6 
Clark, p. 19. 
obtain from the governor of the Russian Am.erican Company the re-
quired permission to sail in the waters in and near Russian Amer-
1ca. When this was denied to him, McDonald turned to Secretary of 
State Cass who replied that it was more important to settle the in-
ternal difficulties in the South before any other matters. After 
this failure to obtain support, McDonald went to Senator Gwin of 
California, who, as we have seen, approached Stoeckl about the mat-
ter in 1854. Now five years later the Senator was again bringing 
7 
up the issue. Gwin, it will be recalled, had procured the assist-
ance of Assistant Secretary of State Appleton. Both of them had 
approached Stoackl with the proposition of buying the Russian col-
onies. In addition to Stoeckl's letter to Gorchakov, dated Decem-
ber 23, 1859/January 4, 1860, Senator Charles Sumner, Chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in his speech of April 9, 
1867, reiterated that Gwin and Appleton had so acted with 
8 
Stoeckle Though there are no records of these abortive propos1-
tions of sale, there are however two witnesses, one from the Uni-
ted States, the other from Russia, both of whom agree about this 
attempted purchase. Besides, the reason why Gwin approached 
Stoeckl in the first place is now clear. Neither in the speech of 
Sumner nor in the letter of Stoeckl was the purpose of Gwin's ac-






WHQ, XII, 83-84. 
Sumner, The Works of Charles Sumner (Boston, 1883), 
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In the post-Civil War period McDonald saw his chance tor es-
tablishing a railroad and steamship company which would connect 
Europe and Asia by a link through America. In order to achieve 
this goal he proposed to erect the Puget Sound Steam Navigation 
Company which would have to be incorporated by the Territory of 
Washington. Even though the advertisements in the newspapers ap-
pear somewhat bizarre, many reputable businessmen subscribed to his 
scheme. The legislature readily passed the bill tor incorporation 
of the company, but they could not extend him any permiSSion to 
navigate in Russian waters. McDonald was advised to send a memor-
ial on the subject to President Johnson in the name of the legis-
lature. This memorial, received in February, 1866, read in part: 
"Your memorialists respecttully request your Excellency to obtain 
such rights and privileges ot the government of Russia, as will 
enable our fishing vessels to visit the harbors ot its posseSSions 
to the end that fuel, water and provisions may be easily obta1ned 
9 
" As far as can be ascertained no answer was given to Mc-. . . 
Donald's request. Not until the follow1ng year is there a reter-
ence in the government pub11c documents when Seward, upon request, 
1nformally subm1tted to the chairman of the Senate comm1ttee some 
notes on Alaska. In his prefatory remarks, Seward states, tiThe 
memorial ot the legislature of Washington Terr1tory to the Presi-
dent, rece1ved in February, 1866, vas made an occaSion, in general 
9uouse Executive Documents, l~O. 177, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
p. 4.------- -- . .. 
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terms, for communicating to Mr. de Stoeckl tbe importance of some 
early and comprebensive arrangement between the two countries, to 
prevent the growth of difficulties arising out of the fisheries in 
10 
the Russian possessions." 
Yet some questions arise concerning this statement. Although 
received in February, 1866, the memorial was not made "the occa .. 
sion lt until eleven months had elapsed. If, as has been stated be-
fore, Seward apparently approached Stoeckl with the request on be-
halt of the Washington citizens so that Stoeckl could gain his ob-
Jective of having the United States make an ofter to purchase the 
territory, why did Seward wait so long? What had taken place in 
the intervening months? To say, as Clark did, that this memorial 
was the work of an isolated crank might be true only in the sense 
that he was its chief proponent. But it does not show how or why 
the Legislature of the Washington Territory should approve such a 
"crank's" move; it does not explain why a legislative assembly 
11 
~ould have been persuaded to act. Furthermore, this statement 
'~oes not try to explain Seward's delayed action upon this petition. 
~id he think it to be the work of a crank? In a certain sense it 
seems irrelevant whether be did or not, tor he used the memorial 
only as a "cause," an "occasion," an "opportunity" to broach the 






In connection with the memorial ot the Washington Territory 
Clark said that the petition tor fur privileges was the work of 
a company of exploiters. To determine the correctness of this 
statement, an examination of the background ot this group will be 
necessary. 
By an agreement in 1839 the Hudsonts Bay Company had received 
from the Russian American Company a grant of leased land, common-
ly known as "the panhandle." This agreement was renewed every ten 
years until 1859 when the Russian American Company leased the land 
to 1862 and then to 1867. In 1866, however, the charter of the 
Russian American Company was soon to expire. The complications 
arising from both of these future expirations are connected with 
Louis Goldstone and Cornelius Cole, later Senator from California. 
In 1865 Louis Goldstone of British Columbia had heard that 
the lease of the Hudsonts Bay Company of the panhandle would ex-
pire in June, 1867, and that the Russian American Company would 
prefer to lease the area to an American Company. Upon his return 
to San Francisco he induced a number of outstanding leaders of 
the state to Join him in the enterprise of establishing what vas 
later incorporated as the California Fur Company; and to obtain 
the required lease, Cornelius Cole was engaged. In a letter to 
Cole dated April 10, 1866 the California Fur Company maintained 
that the present was very opportune tor organizing a trading com-
pany to trade between the Russian colonies and the United States, 
tor the charter granted to the Budsonts Bay Company would soon 
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expire. By promising five per cent of the gross proceeds of its 
transactions, and by employing missionaries to ameliorate the con-
ditions of the Indians, the company surmised that it could readily 
12 
obtain such an agreement from Russia. Cole felt that he should 
negotiate with Stoeckl directly, he traveled to Washington to see 
him. The company was informed that Stoackl had acquiesced in 
these demands, but that no final decision would be made until the 
actual expiration of the charter of the Hudsonts Bay Company. 
Such a stalemate in the negotiations did not satisfy Cole, so 
he wrote to Cassius M. Clay, the American minister at St. Peters-
burg, who was asked to sound out the Russian government or the Rus-
sian American Company on the position they would take towards such 
a proposal. Clay's reply of December 22, 1866 was that the govern-
ment refused to interfere with the matters of the Company, but 
that Cole ought to deal with the Company directly. Six days be-
fore this letter was addressed, however, the Russian government 
had decided already to sell its possessions in North America. 
Thus when Stoeckl came to the United States in the following year, 
1867, he used this refusal to the Goldstone-Cole Company as the 
13 
beginning of his talks with Seward on the proposed purchase. 
12 
Cf. Cornelius Cole, Memoirs of Cornelius Cole Ex-Senator of 
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XIV (October 1927), 243-247. 
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The Secretary of State never seems to have favored the interests 
of the California group, perhaps because he felt that it would 
give another party credit for the purchase. 
So far, the first reason for the purchase has been examined. 
It seems certain that although the Washington memorial may be con-
sidered the work of a "crank," it was still used as an occasion 
to broach the subject. Furthermore, even though Clark may call 
the desire for fur privileges by the California Fur Company the 
work of a group of "exploiters," this does not appear to negate 
14 
the desire in the first place. The main question here is to 
discover whether or not this desire was used as a reason for the 
purchase. From the evidence presented it seems that the desire 
was a reason, even though an indirect one. 
Our attention is now turned to the second reason for the pur-
chase, namely, the refusal of Russia to renew the charter of the 
Russian American Company, which Clark again rejects by stating 
15 
that this reason does not affect the United States. But can 
such a general statement standt Is this to say that the United 
states' purchase on the one hand and Russia's willingness to sell 
because of this refusal had no connectiont To answer these ques-
tions the refusal for a renewal of the charter must be placed in 




the light of Russian foreign policy. Once this is understood, how 
the refusal affected the United States can then be realized. 
To clarify the problem the policy of Russia in the Far East 
before 1840 must be investigated. For over a century and a half 
Russia could Justifiably boast that it had been the only European 
nation able to transact official diplomatic negotiations and to 
carryon trade relations with the Chinese Empire. Although it is 
true that in the first quarter of the nineteenth century the Rus-
sian Foreign Office was burdened with problems of European politi~ 
every Governor-General of Eastern Siberia had been suggesting some 
methods of reconquering the Amur River Valley for Russia. What 
Russia needed most was at least one ice-free port on the Pacific 
Ocean which could act as a key to Russian trade relations. In 
1828 an investigation of the region was ordered, and two years 
later a secret mission was sent tor that purpose. Not until 1842, 
however, did Russia open its eyes to the events in Asia, for Great 
Britain had broken the coveted position of trading with China. 
By the Treaty of Nanking which ended the Anglo-Chinese War, 
(1839-1842) Great Britain obtained the important city of Hong Kong. 
To Russia the effects were even greater, for the war showed them 
the utter corruption of the Ching Empire, which led to the anti-
dynastic movement that culminated in the Taiping Rebellion, and 
the advent of other European powers in Eastern Asia. Thus the na-
ture of international politics was changing in the Far East, and 
63 
for Russia in the Amur River region especially. 
Lest this coveted region be seized by some unfriendly power, 
Czar Nicholas I in September, 1847 appointed Count Nicholas Mura-
viev Governor-General of Eastern Siberia. His instructions were 
to carryon trade and gold mining with China through Kiakhta, but 
secretly he was to direct his advance toward the Amur-Russian fron-
tier. In 1852 a Russian squadron began a reconnaissance mission 
at the mouth of the river. When the Crimean War broke out in 
Europe the following November, the governor-general was told the 
defense ot the Russian possessions was a military need. Hence no 
longer heeding the Chinese, Muraviev advanced down the Amur River 
in April, 1854. By this action he repudiated the Treaty of 
Nerchinsk which had stipulated China's exclusive sovereignty over 
the area. This problem was not settled until four years later by 
the Treaty of Aigun, by which the Russians were given the exclu-
sive right with the Chinese to the navigation of the Amur, Sungari, 
16 
and the Ussuri Rivers. 
While these events were occurring, Russian statesmen were be-
coming cognizant ot the moves Russia ought to make in the Pacific. 
Muraviev had suggested as early as 1853 that Russia should sell 
its colonies to the United States, for Just as it was inevitable 
that America would extend its domain to the Pacific Northwest, so 
16Ct • Selected Documents: Far Eastern International Relations, 
1689-1951, ed. John M. Maki (Seattle, 1951), p. 6. 
'\-18S it also inevitable for Russia to dominate the 'Ihole Pacific 
coast of Asia. He further commented that although the government 
had made the aistalte of letting England gain e foothold in ASia, 
the error could be rectified by a cloGG alliance with the United 
17 
States. 
From the other side ot the globe, Stoeckl too was urging the 
Russian Foreign Office to sell the colonies lest they become a 
source of conflict v1th America. This 1s the tone of his letter 
in which he urged upon the Russian Foreign Secre·tary, Gorchakov:; 
that Russia should turn her attention to the Asiatic coasts and 
18 
especially in the Amur River region. Thus the Rusoian Foreign 
Office vas forced to consider the advisability of retaining the 
colonies in America on the one hand, and of increasing Russia'o 
penetration into Asiatic affairs on the other. 
By 1866, however, a study ot the economic reports was enough 
to shape that decision in the light ot Russia's new Far Eastern 
policy. Between 1865-1866 the exportation and importation together 
petween Russia and Asia had risen by more than five million rubles. 
pt this amount nearly tour million rubles vere in exports. Comput-
~ng the commercial figures o~ the ten years preceding 1866 the 
~otal shoved an aggregate increase of sixty-six per cent. This 
17 
Muraviev to the Emperor, quoted in Tompkins, Alaska, p. 174. 
18 Stoeckl to Gorchakov, December 23, 1859/January 4, 1860, 
;'.!!!!" III, 86. 
increase of Asiatic trade was sharply contrasted to a decrease of 
19 
trade 'td th the American coloniese By 1866 the total incooe of 
the Russian American Company amounted to 706,188 rubles, ot which 
200,000 'Was a treasury ;-:-,oaidy. Lett tor dividends were 10,828 
x'ubles or 1.!J,.5 rubles per 150-ruble share 'W'hich actu.ally 801d on 
the stock exchange at the pr1ce of seventy rubles. Even the can-
cellation or the taxes owed to the government and a subsidy trom 
the government would not suftice to keep the group trom bankrupt-
20 
cy. lience the decision wae made in December, 1866 to sell the 
colonies and to refuse another charter to the RUSSian American 
Company. 
Hov this refusal aftects the United States now becomes clear-
ere The Crimean War directly evidenced Anglo-Russian rivalry; 
this in turn had been indirectly caused by the Anglo-Chinese War, 
tor Russia had seen another European nation gain domination over 
Chinese territory- If then the Anglo-Russian rivalry is coupled 
with RUSSia's refusal to renew the charter it becomes apparent how 
each affected th~ other, for, since Russia had been engaged with 
Great Britain in the Crimean War which resulted in her colonies 
being placed in a defenseless po~1tion, the government began to 
think of selling the colonies. When this happened, it "'as to the 
19 
Clay to Seward, April 17, 1868, Bouse Executive Documents, 
Vol. 1, Pt. I, No.1, pp. 469-410. 
20 
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United States that Russia turned, for the Russian government would 
not want to sell its possessions to Great Britain who was already 
an opponent in the Far East. Thus the simple act of refusal to 
renew the charter in itself would not affect the United States, 
but when that refusal is placed in the context of Russia's posi-
tion in the Far East that refusal affected the United States. 
In continuance of the main purpose of this chapter, the third 
reason for the purchase, namely, the friendship of Russia for the 
United States, can now be studied. Of all the reasons that will 
be investigated perhaps this one has received more comment and cri-
ticism than any other, as will be clearly seen in the discussion. 
Before embarking on a consideration of the friendship of these 
two countries, perhaps it would be wise to analyze some basic con-
cepts. This analysis will be twofold; that is, what friendship is 
in itself, and how friendship differs between people on the one 
hand and nations on the other. It is hoped that these distinc-
tions will result in a separation of some misguided notions from 
the real ones. 
To define friendship is not a simple task. But for all prac-
tical purposes it can be defined as the state of two parties who 
show esteem and respect for each other. Friendship between two in-
dividuals can be one of the highest bonds that Join men together. 
But among nations friendship is not the same, for here friendship 
depends on the statesmen who govern, with the people usually fol-
lowing their leaders' wishes. As Pauline Tompkins has stated, 
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" ••• friendship among nations is determined less by state of mine 
21 
than by state of events; less by sentiment than by experience." 
An exceedingly clear insight into this problem was aptly sum-
marized by Seward in a despatch to Cassius Clay. On May 6, 1861, 
a few months after he had been in office, the Secretary of State 
affirmed that nations and individuals vere alike in having three 
prominent vants, namely, freedom, prosperity, and friends. He 
added that the United States had been fortunate in procuring the 
first two, but that she had been slow in winning friends, with the 
exception of Russia. He asserted that Russia had been and still 
was a constant friend. This was somewhat obvious, for the two na-
tions have never come into rivalry or conflict; but once the two 
had made fla Circuit of half the globe in opposite directions, then 
they shall meet and greet each other in the region where civiliza-
22 
tion first began. • ." It was Clay's task to strengthen and 
keep those bonds of friendship. 
If then there has been a tradition of friendship between the 
United States and Russia in the nineteenth century, some manifesta-
tions of it can be noticed. Notwithstanding the fact that there 
are numerous instances that could be oftered as eVidence, three 
perhaps must sutfice: the Crimean War, the Civil War, and the 
21 Pauline Tompkins, American-Russian Relations in the ~ EasJ 
(New York, 1949), p. 4. 
22 William B. Seward, The Works of William B. Seward, ed. 
George E. Baker, New Edition-(Boston:-1884), V,-246. 
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~dmission of Russian ships in San Francisco. 
During the Crimean War Russia sought to cultivate the friend~ 
ship of the United States, and in fact this var helped this union. 
The majority of the American people felt friendly towards Russia 
aud the government in turn performed many acts of friendship. Fur-
thermore the Russian government vas pleased when the United States 
"forced" Great Britain to accept the principle that free ships 
make free goods--a principle that had been disputed in the Anglo-
American War of 1812. Then too, after the war Russia assured the 
United States that although it had signed the Declaration of Paris 
by vhich it agreed to abolish privateering, that point would not 
be binding between Russia and the United States. This was again 
23 
promised at the outbreak of the Civil War. 
Since Russia's favoring of the North in the Civil War has al-
ready been mentioned in the background of the purchase, it will not 
be reviewed in detail again. It will be remembered, hovever, that 
the United States reciprocated as well by not interfering in the 
Polish quesion. There were practical reasons for these moves, for 
Russia always wanted to break the maritime power of Great Britain 
and sav her chance in supporting the North. Besides the United 
States was certainly too weak to do anything about the Polish quee-
tion even if it so desired. Sevard was not villing to interfere 
in European politics and was thus carrying out the Monroe Doctrine. 
23 
Thomas, p. 120. 
The third instance of friendly relatiolls between Russia and 
~he United States is recorded in a letter of Stoeckl to Gorchakov. 
Ia it he recounts some of the difficulties that the Americans had 
~ncountered with the Russians in Alaska. Once the treaty of 1824 
had expired, the Russians would not allow the Americans to trade in 
any of her colonial possessions in North America. After some in-
sistence, however, the Russians yielded by opening the port of Sit-
ka to trading. But as Stoeckl pointed out this concession was "i1-
lusory, because the Americans were able neither to bring and sell 
their merchandise, nor to buy the products of' our colonies." \oJb.a t 
the Americans were demanding was strict reciprOCity, since they had 
let the Russians not only trade in San Francisco but also allowed 
24 
them to establish some settlements. Actually by the same con-
vention of 1824 the Americans also had the right to keep the Rus-
sians out of their area, but they chose not to do so. This was an-
0ther instance of American goodwill towards Russia before the pur-
chase. 
But what was the basis of this friendship? Apparently it was 
that Great Britain had been antagonistic to the United States since 
the inception of the new Republic. Though there had been some in-
stances of treaties Signed between the couutries, there had also 
oeen ma.ny instances of hard feelings against the British c;overnment. 
~imilarly Russia found that England souGht to gain control of the 
24 
Stoeckl to Gorchakov, July 12/24, 136'7, ill, XLVIII, 528-
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Mediterranean Sea und even of the Baltic Sea. Because of the rise 
ot liberal ideas in Great Britain and France in the early nine-
teanth cent~ry, thC38 countries felt B cl~ser relationship between 
one another than with autocratic Russia. Since the United States 
was Dot that closely knit with Great Britain,Bnd since the latter 
could be stopped only with the help of another power, Russia soughi 
to cultivate the friendship of the United States at all costs. As 
events in the later part of the century proved, such a foundation 
proved to be shallow, for by then Anglo-American interests began 
25 
to COincide more readily than Russo-American interests. 
In commenting on this reason for the purchase, Clark states 
that this friendship has been "over-emphasized" and that Professor 
Golder says that there is "nothing in Russian archives to shov thai 
this affected either state department in the negotiation" for the 
26 
purchase. The validity of this statement can be upheld. None-
theless the tradition of Russo-American friendship played its role 
in the purchase, not as a cause or reason, but an excellent atmos-
phere in which to transact the negotiations. 
The fourth reason for the purchase is "the necessity of pre-
venting the transfer of the territory to an unfriendly power." A-
gain there has been soma confusion on this point. Because Clark 
25 
P. Tompkins, p. 14. 
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'rl 
has attributed the reasons that are under discussion to Senator 
Summer instead of to Representative Banks, seemingly he has been 
mistaken in saying that the fourth reason was the "necessity of 
preventing England from getting it." Indeed this would identify 
England as an "unfriendly power." Clark then adds that England 
was afraid to offend the United States as shown by the way she 
accepted the affronts ot the Senate with regard to the Alabama 
claims. Besides the armed truce in Europe because of Bismarck's 
tactics, England realized the antagonism she had aroused in the 
27 
United States when she could not affomto risk a war with us. 
But the problem is whether the United States considered England 
an unfriendly power into whose hands Alaska might fall. Its solu-
tion can be discovered in an analysis of the background of Anglo-
American relations. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century England began to rea-
lize that the United States would dominate every part of the North 
American continent. Although the United States was having some 
difficulties with Great Britain over Cuba and at the same time had 
cast a rapacious eye on the Sandwich Islands, Great Britain was 
then contemplating jOining France in declaring the neutrality of 
these two islands. This was a warning of John F. Crampton, Bri-






Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. And yet coupled with 
America's determination to occupy this continent was her equal de-
termination not to intervene in the Crimean War in which England 
and Russia were opponents. 
During the Civil War, Anglo-American relations, though some-
times strained, generally remained amicable. True at the begin-
ning of the war Seward had contemplated the establishment of a 
foreign policy that would so arouse the spirit of independence 
within America against European intervention that the Union would 
be saved against the common foe. Lincoln's sagacity, however, re-
jected such a proposal. But within a few months the Secretary of 
State had adopted a policy of caution in foreign affairs--a tributE 
29 
to his statesmanship. This is not to say, however, that later 
events in the war did not arouse a spirit of animosity against 
Great Britain, that spirit was usually limited to the people and 
to the press. The Trent Affair and the depredations of the 
Alabama were crucial instances of possible rupture in Anglo-Ameri-
can relations, but both were settled in a peaceful manner. 
At the close of the war friction had given way to more 
28 Crampton to Clarendon, February 7, 1853, ed. Richard W. Van 
Alstyne, "Anglo-American ReJ.ations, 1853-1857,11 ABR, XLII (April 
1937), 494. 
29 H. C. Allen, Great Britain ~ the United States: A Bistorl 
2! Anglo-American ~elations, l783-l952-rLondon, 1954), p. 461. 
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pacific relations. Two possible points of disagreement still 
existed. The Alabama claims of the United States vere being dis-
cussed between the Department of State and the Court of St. James, 
until the final settlement in the Geneva Arbitration Awards. The 
other point of contention was not so easily disposed of, for it 
involved the annexationist sentiments of the Americans for Canada. 
In the minds of those who sought to revive the "manifest destiny" 
of the early part of that century, Canada would eventually become 
part of the United States. In 1866 a bill introduced into the 
House of Representatives sought to admit the northern neighbor in-
to the Union. Moreover, in the earlier part of the year the 
Fenian movement put a strain on America-Canadian relations. But 
the Canadian government had won support to the cause of Confedera-
tion so that when the British government consolidated the eastern 
portion of the country into the Dominion of Canada in 1867, Amer-
ica had been repulsed. Hence by the time of the purchase of 
Alaska Anglo-American relations had become more amicable. 
Within this framework it is interesting to note the reactions 
of English officials to the purchas~ for this will give some in-
dication of England's attitude. On April 1, 1867 the British gov-
ernment learned that the transaction between Russia and the United 
States had taken place. Lord Stanley, British Foreign Secretary, 
immediately notified Sir Andrew Buchanan, British minister at St. 
Petersburg to get the details from the Russian Foreign Office. 
Gorchakov's reply summarized the economic reasons for Russia's 
74 
willil1gness to sell the colonies, but disclaimed that the move had 
any political significance. To this statement, however, Sir 
Andrew replied that "it might have been considered a friendly act 
on the part of the Russian government if she had afforded Her MaJ-
esty's Government or the Government of Canada, an opportunity of 
purchasing the territory wh1ch had been sold, but that their not 
having done so was materially unimportant as I felt assured it 
would not have been bought." To this Lord Stanley cursorily re-
marked that liBel' MaJesty's Government approve [si<il the language you 
30 
held 1n your conversation with Prince Gorchakov." 
In the British House of Lords, on April 2, 1867, the Duke of 
Buckingham, in reply to a question raised by the Earl ot Clarendon 
concerning the cession of Alaska, stated that although he vas not 
aware ot the full progress of the negotiations tor the ceSSion, 
the transaction might cause "great feeling and possibly consider· 
able excitement. 1I Yet he felt that it would not be a.llowed to 
have nundue weight in the minds of Englishmen," because the ces-
sion would not have such an "overwhelming influence upon the prog ... 
ress ot the colonies sprung trom English blood" as at first glance 
30 Hudson's Bay Company. Certain Correspondence ot ~ 
10reign Otfice and of the Hudson's Bay Companl COtted from the o-
riginal document.:S; YOn'dOil, 1898 .. E.l. Otto i!... Klotz sic]* Dispatch-
from Sir Andrew Buchanan .. St. Petersburg, to Lord Stanley .. April 41 
1867. Draft Cot a dispatch) from the Foreign Oftice, April 16, 
1867 .. to Sir Andrew Buchanan .. quoted in Tompkins .. p. 189. 
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31 
would be imagined. This remark remained unchallenged. 
On this side of the Atlantic Seward showed that he was clear-
ly not antagonistic to Great Br1ati~. In a confidential despatch 
dated March 28, 1867--two days before the treaty of cession was 
signed--the Secretary of State wrote to Charles Francis Adams, the 
American minister in London, that the United States could not ac-
cept the proposal of arbitration in the form offered by Lord 
Stanley concerning the Alabama claims. He then added: "While 
writing this I am not to be understood as insisting that my views 
"I 
in regard to the situation in Great Britain are altogether correct. :~ 
I may, indeed, entirely misunderstand the situation there. Nor am 
I unmindful of the critical nature of the political debates which 
are now occupying the attention of her Majesty's ministers. It is 
not the President's desire to do anything which would be or even 
32 
seem to be unfriendly to Great Britain." Hence the attitude of 
Seward was not anti-British. 
In the Senate Charles Sumner, who had become the staunchest 
supporter of the treaty of cession, discredited any ~laim of an-
ticipation of Great Britain. This he did in the same three-hour 
speech in which he favored the ratification of the treaty. At 
most he would only give slight credence to this motive, for he 
31 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (London, 1867), 3rd Series, 
CLXXXVI, 979-980. 
32 Seward to Adams, House Executive Documents, 40th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., Vol. 1, Pt. I, No.1, p. 76. 
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affirmed "Another motive to this acquisition may be found in the 
desire to anticipate imagined schemes or necessities of Great Bri-
tain. With regard to all these I confess doubtj and yet, if we 
credit report, it would seem as if there were already a British 
1llovement in this direction." He then offered some evidence that 
showed this possibility. A similar view was held by those who 
said that Great Britain was worried about the presence of Russia 
on the American shoresas Spain had once been. To this argument 
Sumner replied, "But I hesitate to believe that the British of our 
day, in any considerable numbers, have adopted the early Spanish 
disquietude at the presence of Russia on this continent." Hence 
33 
Sumner also was not anti-British. 
From the study of this last proposed reason for the purchase, 
it seems clear that the United States, that is, the Department of 
State, did not buy Alaska in order to prevent England from getting 
it. Indeed the Department would not have wanted the area sold to 
another power, for example, France. In the light of her relations 
in the Far East with Great Britain and France, Russia realized that 
the best move would be to sell the colonies to the United States. 
~ut this argument of the anticipation of Great Britain indicates 
the sale of Alaska, not its purchase by the United States, for 
Great Britain had greater stakes in the Near Eastern Question, es-
~ecially with reference to the Dardanelles. On the other hand the 
33sumner, Works, XI, 223-228. 
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question can be raised concerning the likelihood of the United 
States trying to buy a piece of territory i£ the country knows 
that the purchase would be detrimental to Anglo-American relation&. 
At that time America sought the settlement of the Alabama claims. 
A peaceful settlement could not be rightfully expected if America 
bought an area near British possessions with the avowed intention 
that that transaction would impair relations with Great Britain. 
The fourth motive for the purchase thus becomes a pseudo-reason. 
CRAPTER V 
BANKS' LAST TWO REASONS EXAMINED 
At the beginning of the previous chapter it was stated that 
Henry W. Clark had suggested that the fifth and sixth reasons for 
the purchase -- the creation of new industrial interests on the Pa-
clfic necessary to supremacy of our empire on sea and land, and 
also to secure unlimited commerce with Japan and China--may have 
some weight. It is the purpose of this chapter to try to deter-
mine the validity of these reasons. Once the interests on the Pa-
cific coast have been examined, the acquisition of commerce with 
Japan and China will be studied, first in its general background, 
and then, in the light of the interest of Seward in the Far East. 
It will be noted that the fifth, as well as the sixth, reason 
for the purchase is stated in terms of long-term future results. 
It is as if the purchaser is looking toward the distant future and 
seeing the possibilities of the purchase in the emolument which 
can be gained. Hence, although the reason looks toward the future, 
it can be called a reason, for, if the purchase of Alaska were 
made, certain benefits would accrue from that action. Thus the 





involved in the fifth motive now under discus&ion, for by the pur-
chase of Alaska new industrial interests on the Pacific would be 
created. This would result in helping to build the supremacy of 
our empire on sea and land. 
Yet what were those "new industrial interests"? In some re-
spects this has been answered, for in the first reason offered for 
the purchase--the desire of the Pacific coast citizens for fisher-
ies and other privileges--a study has been made of the possibili-
ties of the fisheries and the fur trade. The fisheries included 
not only salmon, cod, herring, but also the whaling industry which 
vas looked on by some as a benefit to be derived from the purchase. 
For instance, the Philadelphia North American and Gazette reported 
on Friday, April 12, 1867, "With this territory in our possession, 
we can now establish whaling ports along that whole CO&st, and 
1 
ship the products home on coasting voyages. If The fur trade was 'Ii 
another aspect of interest in the territory as is evidenced by the 
Russian American Company which, from its inception in 1799, had 
traded the plentiful seal and sea-otter skins in the distant city 
ot Canton, China. In addition the attempt of Senator Cole to ob-
tain the lease of the panhandle which had been granted to the Bud-
son's Bay Company is another instance of interest in the fur trade. 
1 
Philadelphia North American and Gazette, April 12, 1867, 
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13, No. 177, p. 39· 
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Besides the fisheries and the fur trade, other industries 
were hoped for. Among these were the mining of coal, gold, silver, 
and copper as well as the production of timber from the forests. 
Some of these were described in the elaborate speech of Senator 
Sumner in which he expatiated on the resources of the new country. 
His speech was a careful compilation of the writings and descrip-
2 
tions of other who had traversed Alaska from about 1790 and later. 
In order to obtain first hand information about the area, however, 
Congress authorized a scientific expedition to be sent to explore 
the territory and to survey its possible advantages to the United 
States. The expedition left in early June, 1867 and its findings 
were reported towards the end of the same year. But before the 
House of Representatives would appropriate any money tor the pur-
chase, it requested from the President a report relative to the 
territory. Using this report submitted by George Davidson, who 
had been in charge of the scientific expedition, Representative 
Banks presented a golden picture of all the mineral resources and 
3 
possible industrial wealth of the country. He was challenged by 
Washburn of Wisconsin, a bitter opponent of the purchase. 
In the debate that followed in the House Washburn objected 
2 
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that Davidson in his report had gathered only some information 
about the country and had not actually seen or discovered any min-
eral resources. Banks retorted by offering a private letter from 
Davidson in which the latter admitted that a seam of coal had been 
reported on Kachemak Bay, Cook's Inlet, but that the mining of the 
bed would require more engineering talent than the Russian Ameri-
can Company possessed. Washburn then replied by affirming that 
there had not been any source of proof offered by which the Con-
gressmen could conclude that a single vein of coal existed in 
4 
Alaska. At one point in the debate Washburn was accused of read-
5 
ing "only those portions that made against the country." On care-
ful examination however, Banks himself could have been accused of 
a similar charge, for he seems to have used those portions whicb 
would help to win passage of the bill. 
In fact both sides could consider themselves correct, for 
they found what they were looking for in the report which was seri-
ously inadequate about the resources of the territory. The report 
leaves the reader with many reservations about the potential eco-
nomic strength of Alaska. Since this report was so indecisive at 
times, it would be difficult to assess its influence in the pas-
sage of the appropriation; for some Congressmen it was an 
4 
U. S. Congress, Congressional Globe, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
July 1, 1868, Appendix (Washington, 1868), p. 398. 
5 
Ibid. July 7, 1868, Pt. IV, 3806. 
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influential factor, but not for others. This split in the House 
also reveals that not too much was known about the possible indus-
tries that could be created as a result of the purchase. Much of I,i' 
the talk about the wealth of Alaska had been gleaned from stories 
and in some cases from books of those who had been there; but no 
one could ascertain definitely the extent of these possible indus-
tries. Hence this reason for the purchase must be accepted with 
some reservation. This is not, however, to eliminate it entirely, 
for it was a subsidiary cause, albeit a much debated one. 
Thus far the fifth reason for the purchase has been analyzed. 
Our attention will be focussed now on the last reason, namely, to 
secure unlimited commerce with Japan and China. In order to under-
stand how the purchase can be linked to possible commercial devel-
opment with the Orient, it will be necessary to consider the back-
ground of American interests in the Far East before the Civil War. 
This will be followed by a discussion of Seward's interest in this 
area during his term as Secretary of State. Finally the strategic 
importance of Alaska as this affected his interest in the Far East 
will be investigated. 
Even before the Constitution had been ratified in 1789, Ameri-
cans had been interested in the Far Eastern trade. As early as 
1784 Robert Morris of Philadelphia and a group of New York mer-
chants fitted out the Empress £! China for a voyage to Canton. 
Since the Americans no longer traded with Great Britain, they were 
forced to seek other markets, which were readily found in the 
Iii 
" ! 
Orient. But to speak of an early American policy in Asia is to 
speak of the policy of the early Americans there, for there was 
no other policy. This appeared only when there was any obstruc-
tion to the trade and hence the policy was defensive and negative, 
as was clear when the American trade had been opposed and obstruct-
ed on the Pacific Ocean and specifically on the Northwest Coast. 
Once the fur trade declined as part of the Far Eastern trade in 
1820, American interests in the Far East became stagnant. Al-
though some Americans had learned to view the Pacific Ocean in re-
lation to the Asiatic trade, it was not until Japan was opened, 
Shanghai developed, and the Pacific coast settled that the Ameri-
can policy in Asia again included the Pacific Ocean. Then the 
policy no longer was that of individual citizens, but of the De-
6 
partment of State. 
As part of the formulation of this policy, the United States 
ratified treaties with Far Eastern nations, the first of which 
was with the kingdom of-Siam in 1833. Eleven years later America 
Signed the Treaty of Wanghia with China by which some of the pri-
vileges accorded the British by the Treaty of Nanking two years 
previously were also granted to the United States. In their trade 
with China the British were faced with American competition and 
with an attitude toward that trade different from their own. 
6Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study 
of the Policy of the United States with Reference-to China, Japan, 
and~rea ~ the 19th Century (New YOrk, 1941), pp:-69-70. 
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Although some Americans advocated armed force to protect their 
I"ghts, the State Department again and again counseled modera-
7 
tion. Thus the United States was spared from the odious task of 
Darticipating in a war against China. 
Yet with the development of European commerce in China, it 
could hardly be expected that the nations of Korea and Japan would 
be allowed to maintain their policy of exclusion. Although the 
Dutch alone controlled the right to trade directly with Japan, 
and the flags of Great Britain and France had been seen in Japa-
nese waters, to two western countries the opening of Japan was ex-
tremely important. Russia on the north had penetrated as far 
south as the Kurile Islands and sought the possession of Karafuto 
(Sakhalin) in order to complete her domination of the Amur River 
Valley. Her advance was a source of worry to Japan, not so much 
commercially as politically. Yet in the case of the United States 
commercial interests predominated, for with the development of 
direct shipping between San Francisco and Shanghai the Japanese 
islands were on a direct route. Thus the United States stood to 
gain from the opening of Japanese ports more than any other com-
B 
mercial state. Hence it was that in 1853 Commodore Mathew C. 
7Payson J. Treat, ItThe Foundations of American Policy in the 
Far East,1t The Semicentenary Celebra,:tion of the Foundin6 of ~ 
Uni versi tx of California with an Acco~li1t of th3 Conference on In-
ternational-aelations, 18~9~ (Ber-keley, 1919), p.347. ----
8payson J. Treat, The Earl~ D1flomatic Relations Between the 





Perry opened Japan and was able in the following year to sign a 
treaty of friendship with the Japanese Empire. A comparison of 
this treaty with the Treaty of Wanghia ten years earlier shows 
that Perry had worked diligently and yet gained very little. But 
to stop at this comparison would be unfair, for the treaty was 
looked upon by him as part of the foundations for an American com-
mercial empire in Asia and in the Pacific. He was not interested 
in protecting American mercantile interests in Japan alone, but he 
coupled these interests with the political issues of Asia and of 
the Pacific and viewed them as a whole. His treaty was but a par-
9 
tial answer to the solution of this problem. 
In brief then, American prestige in Asia had risen to a point 
where Americans could influence and determine the policy of other 
nations. Bot only had she been successful in opening Japan, but 
also the American ministers and consuls in China had performed 
their tasks creditably. The British and the French surrendered 
their exclusive concessions granted them by the Chinese govern-
ment, a system of maritime inspection under foreign control had 
been established, and no chance was afforded these nations to in-
tervene in favor of the Taiping rebels. These were some of the 
outstanding results of the American policy of strengthening and 
supportlng the Chinese government. These achievements were not 
the result so much of the instructions of the Department of State, 
9 
Dennett, p. 270. 
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but of the sagacity of the ministers and consuls themselves and 
the position of neutrality that the United States assumed during 
the Crimean War. 
During the Buchanan administration American influence in Asia 
began to vane, principally because domestic problems in the United 
States eclipsed any interest in Far Bastern international rela-
tions. To bu11d on the foundation so far created little effort 
vas expended. Yet there vas one exception to this statement, for 
the treaty of Townsend Harris in 1858 with Japan became "the most 
brilliant diplomatic achievement of the United States in Asia for 
10 
tt the entire century • This was not due to any instructions . . 
from Pres1dent Buchanan or Secretary of State Cass, but to the 
skilful diplomacy of Harris alone. 
By 1861 through diplomatic maneuvering at once characterized 
by foresight and expediency the American government had arrived 
at a fairly definite Far Bastern policy. Created out ot prece-
dents and decisions, tbis policy was founded upon the "most-tavored 
nation" prinCiple, equivalent to the tlopen-door" policy, and was 
incorporated into two treaties, one with Japan, the other with 
China. This policy included the decision not to acquire any ter-
ritorial possessions or protectorates in Asia or the PacifiC Ocean; 
and the determination to sustain China, and by inference Japan, 
thus fixing the United States as opposing any movement of the 





Western powers to interfere with the territorial integrity or the 
political sovereignty of Asiatic states. Ultimately this would 
lead to the maintenance of an open door by the states themselves. 
Notwithstanding her favoring this principle, the United States 
also had sought cooperation with the other treaty powers in all 
peaceful measures to obtain the fulfillment of the treaties and 
the protection of foreign interests. The cooperative policy did 
not include alliances, for the American government refused to en-
ter into one with Great Britain and France during their gun-boat 
policy against China in 1851-1860. Nor would the United States 
endorse the policy of Joint treaties as can be seen by the indivi-
dual treaties with the various governments of the Western powers 
signed at Tientsin. Upon these foundations Secretary of State 
11 
William H. Seward had to build in the eventful years 1861-1869. 
Before taking his new position in 1861, Seward had already 
formulated certain positive opinions on the nature, purpose, and 
future of American international relations in the Far East. As 
senator from New York he supported American interests in the 
Orient, prinCipally the establishment of American foreign trade 
on a firmer basis. In his opinion the Pacific Ocean would become 
"the chief theatre in the events of the world's great hereafter," 
for he was certain that the American people had a definite role to 
88 
12 
play in the development of the commerce on that ocean. Americans 
should contribute their political heritage, not military strength 
to the peoples of Asia, for as the Atlantic states were helping in 
the social and political development of the states of Europe and 
Africa, so also "the Pacific states must necessarily perform the 
same sublime and beneficent functions in Asia. 1t Seward felt that 
13 
Asia so enriched by America would repay the gift with gratitude. 
In Seward's mind the value of the Pacific coast was paramount. 
Although he held certain convictions on the question of slavery, 
he was even more convinced that the admission of California as a 
state, even if it became slave territory, was far outweighed by 
the advantages it would give to the American Pacific coast. He 
wholeheartedly supported the Japan expedition, urged the comple-
tion of the surveys of the Pacific Ocean, and above all, was con-
spicuous in his leadership of the projected transcontinental rail-
road and the beginning ot a line of mail steamers from San Francis-
co by way ot the Sandwich Islands to Japan and China. All of 
these policies were epitomized by his statement in the Senate on 
January 26, 1853. In his speech entitled "Continental Rights and 
Relations" he showed his audience that the commerce of the world 
was to be sought "not on the American lakes, nor on the Atlantic 
12 U. S. Congress, Congressional Globe, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
July 29, 1852, Vol. 24, Pt. III (Washington, 1852), p. 1975. 
13 
Ibid. 31st Cong., 1st Sess., March 11, 1850, Vol. 22, Pt. I 
(Washington, 1850), p. 262. 
89 
coast, nor on the Caribbean sea, nor on the Mediterranean, nor on 
the Baltic, nor on the Atlantic ocean, but on the Pacific ocean, 
and its islands and continents." He urGed the senators to watch 
closely the movements of France, Russia, and Great Britain espe-
cially in the areas where they were to be found "on those conti-
nents and seas in the East where the prize which you are contend-
14 
ing with them for is to be found." From the roster of conspic-
uous leaders of that day Lincoln chose a secretary of state who 
had reflected on the Far Eastern question and America's role 
therein. 
Without retraversing ground that has already been scrutinized, 
it must be remembered that the primary interests of Seward in 1861 
and later were those of the Civil War, especially the possible re-
cognition of the independence of the South by other nations. Al-
though this interest was primary, Seward did not allow himself to 
be unconcerned about the Far East where he found that the United 
States was committed to a policy of cooperation. This he heartily 
endorsed for it would gather together the European nations in a 
group with, not against, the United States at the opening of the 
war. Furthermore, the European nations, especially France and 
Great Britain, also favored such cooperation for they had already 
seized what they wanted from China. 
From July, 1661 until November, 1867 Seward was fortunately 
blessed with a most capable minister in China, Anson Burlingame. 
14Seward, Works, III, 618. 
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Although he entered the China scene after the storm of the Opium 
War of 1857-1860, Burlingame was able to do constructive work in 
the further development of an American x;olicy in China. A master-
fu1 person, capable of commanding a diplomatic Situation, the A-
merican minister was predominant in Peking, and hence over Ameri-
can policy in China. Seward was shrewd enough to sense this, so 
the customary long instructions were not sent to Burlingame. Rath-
er Seward's role was to approve the action of Burlingame; the Sec-
retary of State "initiated nothing except the immigration section 
of the Treaty of 1868" which, though often called the Burlingame 
15 
Treaty, might more properly be called the Seward Treaty. 
An opportunity to instruct the new minister presented itself 
when Seward sent a despatch approving Burlingame's conduct in the 
Taiping Rebellion, and added that he should put forth every effort 
to consult and cooperate with the other representatives. Even be-
fore the despatch arrived, the American minister already had adopt-
16 
ed this program a& part of his policy. A few months after the 
end of the Civil War Seward reiterated his program for China: "The 
Government of the United States is not disposed to be technical 
or exacting in its intercourse with the Chinese Government, but 
15 Dennett, p. 410. 
16 
Seward to Burlingame, March 6, 1862, House Executive Docu-
ments, Vol. 1, Pt. I, No.1, p. 839. 
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but vill deal with it in entire frankness, cordiality and friend-
ship. The United States desires neither to interfere vith the 
distinct and ancient habits and customs of the Chinese people, nor 
to embarrass the members of the foreign board in their difficult 
17 
and responsible task." Such were the statements that helped to 
maintain the cooperative policy of sustaining the Chinese Imperial 
Government. 
Outside of China, hovever, Sevard's policy of cooperation 
took on different aspects, so much so that he pursued a policy at 
times patently un-American. When he was informed from Yedo in May, 
1861 that it seemed that the Japanese might disregard the treaties 
of 1858 and perhaps expel the foreigners, Seward proposed a Joint 
naval expedition against Japan. He addressed the ministers of the 
respective governments that had diplomatic relations with Japan 
and urged them to a projected convention that "contemplated the 
dispatch of a fleet of steamers adequate to impress the Japanese 
government with the ability and the determination of the states 
18 
engaged, to secure the performance of its treaty stipulations." 
Townsend Harris, the American minister to Japan, disapproved of 
such a move and felt that Seward did not understand the situation 
in Japan. The expedition never materialized, however, much to the 
17 
Seward to Burlingame, August 14, 1865, House Executive Doc-
uments, Vol. 1, Pt. II, No.1, p. 461. ---
18 
Seward to Townsend Harris, August 1, 1861, House Executive 






credit of the United States. Yet even then Seward would again use 
19 
this policy in Japan and even attempt the same in Korea. 
An interesting light is cast not only on Seward's policy but 
also his methods by an incident of which he 'Was informed in the 
early months of 1867, the same time as the purchase of Alaska oc-
curred. 
, 
S. Wells Williams, the charge d'affaires at Peking during 
Burlingame's absence on leave to the United States, notified 
Seward that some French missionaries had been put to death in Ko-
rea, and that Admiral Roze with some French naval vessels had gone 
there to investigate the matter. Upon their return the Admiralil] 
informed Williams that he had learned from Korean natives that in 
August, 1866 an American trading schooner, the Ge.eral Sherman, 
had been caught in a river in Korea and the Americans had been 
20 
killed. By December Burlingame, having returned to China, was 
, 
able to inform Seward that the French charge, M. de Bellonet, had 
formally notified the minister of state in China, Prince Kung, 
that France would attempt the conquest of Korea and would estab-
21 
lish a protectorate there. 
The facts behind the Franco-Korean situation need not detain 
19For examples of the future use of this policy, cf. Tyler 
Dennett, "Seward's Far Eastern Policy," AHR, XXVIII (October 
1922) 49-50. 
20 Williams to Seward, October 24, 1866, House Executive Docu-
ments, Vol. 1, Pt. I, No.1, pp. 414-417. 
21 
Burlingame to Seward, December 12 1866, ibid. 419; for the 
Be110net-Kung correspondence, cf. ibid. 419-427.----
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us, since our purpose is to investigate the matter from the Ameri-
can viewpoint. Four days after receiving the despatch from Bur-
lingame, Seward, not knowing that the French government had repu-
diated the action of Bellonet, spoke to M. Berthemy, the French 
minister in Washington. The Secretary of State then proceeded to 
outline a plan for the American forces to join the French to ob-
tain reparations from the Koreans for the murders of the Y~ench 
and the Americans, and then conclude a treaty with the nation s1m-
ilar to those which had been made with Japan and China. The Fren~ 
minister was somewhat surprised at the proposal but approved of 
it. Yet before the American proposal had reached Pariss the 
French government, faced with the failure of the Mexican fla8co 
and Admiral Roze's abortive expedition, found it necessary to an-
nounce that the first reports trom Korea were misleading and that 
22 
a great victory had been won by France. Bence there was no rea-
son for carrying out the American proposal. Once again Seward was 
saved from what would have been a disgraceful action, for, as the 
facts proved later, the General Sherman had no right to enter the 
Korean river and its crew apparently had started the hostilities. 
The incident was part of the price Seward was willing to pay for a 
policy of cooperation in the Far Bast. 
Another glance at this proposal, however, reveals some fresh 
aspects. The proposed treaty with Korea seems to have been some-
22 
Dennett, ABR, XXVIII, 52-58. 
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what like the treaty of the purchase of Alaska. In the contem-
plated action against Korea Seward did not mention the necessity 
of obtaining the consent from Congress as he had done earlier in 
the Joint naval expedition against Japan in 1861. It appears as 
if he wanted to circumvent the Senate and then present it with a 
treaty with Korea, as he did a few weeks later in the purchase of 
Alaska. In addition, Seward concealed from Stoeckl his reasons for 
favoring the purchase of Alaska, just as he had done a few weeks 
earlier. On this point Dennett has remarked, "The conjunction of 
the two negotiations at least makes reasonable the conjecture that 
the purchase of Alaska was a piece of Far Eastern policy the full 
23 
significance of which is not yet realiz,d.1! 
Are there any other details which seem to have been omitted 
which show a connection between Seward's Far Eastern policy and the 
purchase of Alaska? It is true that Dennett has shown that Kiska 
in the Aleutian Islands was a good American port nearest to the 
northern Asiatic coast, but he goes on to speak of the interest of 
~apan in America's possession in the Five-Power Naval Treaty of 
24 
1922. In his book, Americans in Eastern ASia, Dennett states, 
" • • • it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Seward saw in 
~laska and the Aleutian Islands a way of 'extending a friendly 
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Secretary's son, has shown that the motive back of the purchase 
was the desire for advanced naval outposts in the north PaCific 
26 
and the West Indies which had been lacking during the Civil War. 
This argument about the need of naval stations is also sub- I I 
stantiated by a statement Seward made at Rutland, Vermont on Sep-
tember 2, 1852. Speaking of the necessity of American expansion, 
Seward asked what the explorations and expeditions about Japan 
and the Sandwich Islands meant "but the necessity of naval sta-
tions in the PaCific ocean?,,27 Similarly President Johnson in his 
annual message to Congress on December 3, 1867 affirmed that dur-
ing the Civil War there was a "universal feeling of the want of 
an advanced outpost between the Atlantic coast and Europe." This 
was also true on the Pacific coast where the required foothold 
was tlfortunately secured by our late treaty with the Emperor of 
Russia ••• ,,28 If it is recalled that Seward announced the pos-
session of Midway Island in Septemter, 1867, and also reaffirmed 
tha~ ~LI anaexation of the Sandwich Islands was desirable, it will 
be seen ~hat his son's assertion is true. 
However, it is not too clear how the purchase of Alaska and 
26 Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington as Senator ~ 
Secretary of State, 1861-1872 (Bew YOrk, 1891), III, 347. 
27 
Seward, Works, III, 187. 
28Annual Message of the President, December 3, 1867, House 












the Aleutians would help to "extend a friendly hand to Asia." A 
glance at the map will show that Kiska vas the nearest good harbor 
to northern Asia. The problem is, did Seward sae this? In other 
words, can a motive for the purchase by Seward be his knowledge 
of the nearness of Alaska and the Aleutians as a stepping-stone 
to Asiat Be already knew of the amount and growth of commerce 
with China and Japan. Did he buy Alaska in order to IIfaci11tate 
and secure unlimited commerce with Japan and Ch1na!! which Banks 
has offered as the sixth reason for the purchase~ 
the proble~ can be solved. 
Let us see if 
A careful scrutiny of the published works of Seward and the 
diplomatic correspondence during his term of office reveals at 
least one source concerning his direct knowledge of the strategic 
position of Alaska,. In his speech urging the senate to approve &. 
resolut1on for the explorat10n of the courses of navigat10n used 
by American whaling vessels in the region of the Bering Straits, 
Senator Seward displayed a keen knowledge of Pacific Ocean geog-
raphy which he obtained from 1nformation supplied him by Lieute-
nant M. F. Maury of the Naval Observatory. Among the places 
Seward mentioned for this exploration were the coasts of Palawan, 
the West London, Prince ot Wales and Paulo Sapata Islands, and the 
coasts of China and Formosa. Be continued: "Then proceeding 
northwardly, a regard to the satety ot the whaleman demands tuat 
the islands between the coasts of China and Ja.pan, aud 1';('Ot;;. then), 
to the Loo Choo Islands, and so on to the Russian possessions, and 
II 
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along them eastwardly to Behr1ng's Straits, should be surveyed •• 
• • Lastly, . . • we encounter islands, and many shoals imperfect-
ly def1ned, and especially the Bonin Islands; while prudence re-
qu1res a careful reconnoissance also of the Fox Islands, wh1ch, 
although lying somewhat northwardly of the passage, might ••• 
afford shelter in case of inclement weather." In cohclusion he 
stated that because such a survey was lacking the United States 
could not choose or establish a coaling station, although the 
29 
length of the voyage was seven thousand miles. 
Besides this statement, there are two indirect sources which 
Seward knew about and helped to broadcast so that the purchase 
might be accomp11shed. The first of these is the speech which 
Senator Sumner delivered in favor of ratification of the purchase. 
A few statements that have seemingly been hitherto overlooked may 
shed some light on the purchase. Seward's son had stated that h1s 
father was searching for needed naval outposts 1n the north Pacif-
ic. It is rather curious that Sumner reiterates this point 1n his 
speech by showing that the absence of harbors on the Pacific 1n 
the possess10n of the United States had limited the 1nfluence of 
America there. Beyond Puget Sound, however, the harbors were more 
abundant and were "all nearer to the great marts of Japan and Ch1-
na." But even if no new harbors were opened, San Francisco 1tself 
29 
Congress1onal Globe, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 24, Pt. 
Ill, p. 1975. 
would be closer to the East by way of the Aleutians than by way of 
Honolulu. In order to clarify this point, Sumner went on to say 
that from a cursory glance at a map a voyage from San Francisco to 
Hong Kong by the common way of the Sandwich Islands was 7,140 
miles, but the same trip by way of the Aleutians was 6,060 miles, 
approximately a thousand miles less. Thus a ship could not only 
get its stores there faster, but with the advantage of carrying 
much less coal. He added that a voyage from Sitka or from Puget 
Sound, the terminus of the Northern Pacific Railroad, would still 
30 
be shorter than the distance stated. 
What Sumner was offering here was a discussion of the great 
circle route from San Francisco to Shanghai and Canton by way of 
the Fox or Aleutian Islands. This had been suggested as early as 
January 10, 1847 by Lieutenant M. F. Maury of the Naval Observa-
tory in a letter to T. Butler Xing, Chairman of the House Commit-
tee on Naval Affairs, who had requested more data on the proposed 
route which Maury had previously suggested. The proceedings in 
the House terminated in a Joint resolution of the House and the 
Senate which stated khat the Secretary of the Navy should "estab-
lish a line of war steamers • • • from one of the above ports on 
the American coast[i.e., Monterey or San Franc1sc~ by way of the 
Aleutian, or Fox Islands, to Shanghai, and thence to Canton, 
30 









in China." It is almost improbable that Seward did not know 
about this route since it was from Lieutenant Maury that he got 
his information about the Pacific Ocean for his speech two years 
later. Nor does it appear likely that he would be ignorant of the 
Joint resolution which referred to a topic about which he later 
spoke in the Senate. 
Sumner's statement about the great circle route was actually 
investigated. Reference has already been made to the report of 
George Davidson of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey. 
Re had been sent on a scientific expedition in June, 1867 to ex-
plore Alaska in conjunction with Captain W. A. Howard of the Reve-
nue Service, at that time a part of the Treasury Department. They 
were to make a geographical reconnaissance of the coast and report 
on the physical features and resources of the country in the time 
allotted for the expedition. 
In his report to Superintendent Benjamin Peirce of the Surve~ 
dated November 30, 1867, Davidson showed that he had been studying 
the currents and winds about the Japanese waters, their effects on 
the climate of Alaska, and also their "effect upon the question of 
the great circle route from San Francisco to China. 1t He added that 
"the currents, their effects upon the weather and the prevailing 
westerly winds, will, in the absence of the strongest advantages, 
31 Cf. U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Reports of 
the Committees of the House of Representatives, 30th Cong., 1st 






decide the question against the great circle route from San Fran-
cisco to Yokochama, or even to Hokodadi." He explained that the 
Colorado had tried to take this route from Asia to America, but, 
because of fog and heavy currents, was forced to take the southern 
route. On a westward trip a ship would encounter adverse winds 
the whole distance and adverse currents about two-thirds of the 
way. 
If a few extra days were needed because of bad weather, the 
coal supply would run short. Under such circumstances the great-
est inducement for adopting this route would be "the discovery of 
deposits of good coal among the Aleutian Islands, or within a rea-
32 
sonable distance of the harbor nearest the great circle route." 
Ho~e of finding a source of coal was shattered, however, when 
Captain Howard reported to Secretary of the Treasury McCulloch thai 
from information he had received from the officers of the Russian 
American Company and the captains of steamers on the coast, the 
"coals on all the Aleutian Islands are too light, with too much 
residuum for steaming purposes." Representative Washburn made use 
of this statement to show Alaska's worthlessness in his report a-
33 
gainst the proposed appropriation. After the expedition returnea 
to the United States, Davidson held conferences with Seward and 
32 Davidson to Peirce, November 30, 1867, House Executive Docu-
ments, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. 13, No. 177, p. 241. ----
33 gouse Report, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., No. 37, pp. 57-58. 
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McCulloch in order to explain his report. 
There are some facets of these events that seem more than 
coincidental. If it is accepted that Seward was interested in na-
val outposts as his son stated and as Seward's schemes for getting 
San Domingo and St. Thomas in the Caribbean also show, would it 
be too much to conjecture that Seward had offered the evidence of 
the short distance between San Francisco and Canton to Sumner? 
Though the SCientific expedition was sent with the purpose of de-
termining new coaling stations, it was discovered that the theory 
could not be put into practice. Nonetheless the problem presents 
itself as to who had such an inquiry incorporated as a possible 
part of the investigation for the expedition? Who ordered David-
son to inquire about the great ~ircle route? The only possibility 
seems to be Seward who was intensely interested in building and 
strengthening commerce with Japan and China. His projected expe-
dition against Korea made but a few weeks before the Alaska pur-
chase has been noted. Two years later in a speech at Sitka he at-
firmed that the fur trade had been the sole basis of Russian com-
merce on this continent, and that it was understood "that the sup-
ply of furs in Alaska has not diminished, while the demand for 
35 them in China and elsewhere has immensely increased." Thus 
there are indications by which it can be asserted that Seward saw 
34 
DaVidson, The Alaska Boundary, p. 13. 
35seward, Works, V, 564. 
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the strategic importance of Alaska in the development of commerce 
in the Far East. 
At this point it might be well to restate our position. It 
is not affirmed that Sevard clearly and concisely saw that Alaska 
was strategically important. For this there is not ample evidence, 
but it is suggested that, given his knowledge and interest in the 
Far East and the Pacific Ocean, and given the fact that the pur-
chase included the Aleutians as well, Seward bought Alaska to fa-
cilitate and secure unlimited commerce with Japan and China. 
Otherwise the last reason offered by Banks seems empty, for know-
ledge of the commercial value of Alaska itself wao ~ot too well 
known as has been shown. The purchase of an unknown commercial 
value could help to facilitate and secure an unlimited commerce 
with Japan and China only because of its strategic position on the 
Pacific, a stepping-stone to Far Eastern Asia. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout this study it has become apparent that the pur-
chase of Alaska was not an isolated incident in the history of the 
United States, because for nearly a century Americans had been in-
terested in the Pacific Northwest. Believing that she had better 
claims than any other rival there; Russia asserted extreme preten-
sions in the ukase of 1821. In reply, the American government af-
firmed the Monroe Doctrine and eventually was able to come to some 
understanding with Russia in the treaty of 1824. Great Britain, 
also opposing Russia's pretensions, partially settled the problem 
by a treaty with Russia in the following year. Although some mis-
interpretations of these treaties followed, no serious rupture oc-
curred. Meanwhile Russia, whose interests conflicted with British 
interests in the Mediterranean Sea and the Straits, was engaged in 
the Crimean War. This resulted in the Russian government's change 
of attitude towards her American colonies which were now open to 
attack by British ships. Some Americans tried to purchase the 
Russian possessions , but without success, partially because the 
Civil War interrupted any further attempts. Even then the Russian 
American Company had proved its inability to govern its colonies, 
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since every time the charter was to be renewed, investigations 
were made; but the colonies continued to be a serious liability, 
not an asset, to the Russian government. By December, 1866 the 
sale of the colonies was agreed upon, and in March of the follow-
ing year the United States became the new possessor. 
For Russia, interested again in the complete acquisition of 
the Amur River Valley, and realizing that the colonies were a bur-
den on the economy and defenseless in time of war, the move was a 
wise one. But if Russia had not been successful in obtaining rev-
enue from Alaska, what assurance did the United States have? Why 
then did the American government purchase the territory? It is 
hoped that this study of the six reasons offered by Representative 
Nathaniel P. Banks has answered that question. 
In the background of the purchase were the friendly Russo-
American relations which favored such speedy, successful negotia-
tions. Although Russia did not seek to sell the colonies to Great 
Britain lest it become more powerful, the United States, on the 
other hand, did not purchase the territory out of the necessity of 
preventing England from getting the area. Why this was so has 
been clarified from a study of Anglo-American relations in the 
post-Civil War period. In order to expedite the sale, the Russian 
government refused to renew the charter of the Russian American 
Company. On America's part, some citizens of the Pacific coast 
began to agitate for fisheries and other privileges. And yet 
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because of the scant knowledge of the resources of Russian America, 
the fifth reason--the creation of new industries on the Pacific--
exercised only a minor role whose extent was difficult to deter-
mine. Lastly, how the purchase secured unlimited commerce with 
Japan and China was studied within the framework of Seward's in-
terest in the Far East. In the days when steamers were used in 
transoceanic shipping, coaling stations and the shortest routes 
were the answers to the achievements of any leading maritime na-
tion. It was suggested that Seward, knowing this, also realized 
the strategic importance ot Alaska and the Aleutian Islands toward 
the development of American commerce in the Far East. In brief, 
then, tive ot the six reasons offered by Representative Nathaniel 
P. Banks played their part in inducing the United States to 
purchase Alaska. 
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